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Foreigners have long been curious about the country that so fiercely safeguards the
privacy of its internal affairs, but China’s historical reputation for manifesting an aloof
and uninterested attitude towards others has left many outside scholars little choice but
to study and examine the country from an external perspective. However, given the
continuing controversy and speculation surrounding China’s rise over the past few
decades, it is imperative for scholars in this field to become more well-versed in the
foundations of China’s social and cultural traditions, to reorient their theoretical
approaches to reflect a more relevant perspective in their studies. Of China’s various
historical institutions, three are identified as salient pillars for the development of its
political culture: social traditions, military philosophies, and the principle of nonintervention. Each is discussed and reviewed within the context of Chinese history
following the political evolution of Chinese governance, and examined specifically in the
post-1949 period. The durability of these various influences are then evaluated in
conjunction with three critical elements of modern China’s political agenda, namely its
geopolitical security, its gradual evolution towards “democracy with Chinese
characteristics,” and its so-called “charm offensive” to establish international
legitimacy. Finally, some concluding remarks comment on the implications that these
policies may have, both on the domestic level and within the international sphere.
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For most of China’s long history, it has striven for self-sufficiency and isolation from the
rest of the international community. However, due to its sheer size and demographics,
scholars and politicians alike have long been curious about the country that so fiercely
safeguards the privacy of its internal affairs. China’s historical reputation for manifesting
an aloof and uninterested attitude towards others has left many outside scholars little
choice but to study and examine the country from a foreigner’s perspective. Thus, it
should come as little surprise that scholarship on China has always been somewhat
limited in nature, focusing more on external interpretations of Chinese events and
decision-making.
The past few decades have been especially thought-provoking for those who have
kept a watchful eye on Chinese politics throughout its history. Centuries of a relatively
quiet, stable, and generally ignored political situation within China were quickly
shattered by an astounding military victory in 1949 by the Chinese Communist Party
(henceforth “the Party”), an unlikely underdog in a revolution that would pivot and
transform Chinese history from that moment forward. As the defeated Nationalists
retreated to Taiwan, the Party, led by the charismatic Mao Zedong, took over political
power and proceeded to redefine and rewrite the Chinese approach towards military
strategies and political agendas. International observers, unsure of what to expect from
the unpredictable nascent power, reacted to the sudden turn of events with both awe and
apprehension, struggling to make sense of Mao’s revolutionary framework and ambitious
vision for China’s future.

All Chinese text in this study will be transcribed using the pinyin Romanization system, which was adopted
as the international standard by the International Organization for Standardization in 1982. Any citations or
quotations of external resources that employ older transcription systems (e.g. Wade-Giles) will be cited in
their original form.
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In the following decades, as China traversed an entire spectrum of political
personalities from international hermit to rising economic superstar, the global media, the
academic community, and interested policymakers alike all closely scrutinized its every
move, casting the historically enigmatic country in various roles, from that of a
dangerous ideological enemy to a powerful trading ally for the West and magnanimous
benefactor for the rest. As a result, while a multitude of scholarship exists on these
various topics, many, especially those regarding the scope and potential impact of
China’s political and military strategies on the international community, are predicated
upon Western views of power, statecraft, war, military strategy, geopolitics, diplomacy,
ideology, institutionalism, and democracy to explain China’s strategic interests and to
project the span of its predicted rise to power.
This study will afford a revisionist perspective and an alternative explanation of
China’s political strategies as it continues to emerge as an international leader. Contrary
to much of Western public opinion, China’s magnificent economic growth and political
development since 1949, while undoubtedly competitive internationally, do not
necessarily reflect malignant intentions to disrupt the global balance of power. This is not
to say that China is completely satisfied to simply incorporate itself into an existing
international political system—it does challenge the present order of nation-states both
politically and economically while simultaneously questioning the distribution of
resources amongst states. Despite China’s self-claimed position as a champion for the
third world, the two statements above are not contradictions; the emphasis is on the
semantics of the claim. While it is undeniable that the Chinese have grand ambitions for
economic growth, social development, and leadership on a regional, and most likely
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global, scale, it is very important to underscore the fact that its intentions are natural and
pragmatic for a state of its size (both territorially and demographically), and do not reflect
any strategically injurious quest for world domination.
This investigation thus takes the approach of examining customs and traditions
throughout China’s long history to establish a potential theoretical foundation for modern
Chinese political culture. Drawn from a variety of influences stemming from regional
social philosophies to endemic military thought, Chinese political theory and values can
be observed as a marriage between its strong social, historical, and cultural traditions
with a sense of pragmatism. Despite the recent transition of leadership and Mao’s
determination to overthrow centuries of nearly crystallized Chinese conventions and
ideologies, the Chinese way has persevered in an incredible, though unsurprising way,
given China’s history as one of the world’s oldest continuous civilizations. Its political
culture is arguably as persistent, with its current identity simply taking on some
contemporary twists for adapting to and evolving with the modern international political
scene, a trend that is most likely to continue for the foreseeable future.
To set the stage for in-depth exploration of how China’s political values has
evolved over time, the first section of the study will focus on the ideologies and customs
that have formed the durable backbone of both Chinese society and its political culture.
Two forms of social philosophies critically influenced the development of Chinese
society up to and, as some would argue, beyond the 1949 revolution: Buddhism and
Confucianism. Though Western scholars have long categorized both of these ideologies
as religious institutions, the term “social philosophy” is used very deliberately to
distinguish the minimal role of theology and the limited role of deity worship in society.
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Rather, both Buddhism and Confucianism may be construed as frameworks for ensuring
social harmony, a core principle of ancient Chinese society. The concept of a harmonious
society serves as an idealistic paragon for social behavior and interaction, affecting the
entire Chinese populace; its perceived success for maintaining peaceful and productive
interactions between all people is demonstrated by widespread adoption elsewhere in
East Asia. As Buddhism espouses a stronger theological foundation and embraces more
religious tenets than Confucianism, it serves to guide individuals towards finding a
greater peace and enlightenment—lessons that would come to transcend the spiritual
experience and reorient society on a similar quest towards harmony. Confucianism, on
the other hand, emphasizes the rituals and responsibilities to be performed by each
individual in society to ensure smooth overall operation. By studying the evolution and
subsequent influences of these two interacting ideologies over time, one gains a sense of
how tradition was established in China, and how such a rich heritage comes to contribute
to and strongly flavor Chinese political culture in the modern age.
The second section of this study will shift focus from the social to the martial,
with an abbreviated examination of how military philosophies have developed throughout
Chinese history and its impact on modern political culture. No section on Chinese
military theory would be complete without at least a reference to Sunzi’s1 academically
fashionable Art of War, but to incorporate only an analysis on the brief work would be an
incomplete approach to the subject. Other key sources of investigation include the
traditional Chinese epic, Romance of the Three Kingdoms as well as the popular Chinese
strategy game of wéiqí, or go. Hence, this study will propose a facelift for the familiar
concept of the grand chessboard—as popularized by the eponymous work of former U.S.
1

Sunzi’s name is also commonly Romanized as Sun Tzu or Sun Wu.
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National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski—and transform the strategic analogy
into a much more suitable Chinese counterpart: the grand wéiqí board. This simple
tweaking provides significant insight on the formation and execution of Chinese political
strategy, and most importantly, how to interpret such actions from an external
perspective.
The next section will look at how these social and military philosophies mesh to
shape a critical pillar of Chinese political culture: non-intervention. As the selfproclaimed contemporary leader of the developing world, China has strongly embraced
the concept of non-intervention, proudly touting it as the catchphrase for its global
political agenda in direct contrast to the interventionist mentality espoused by its peers
elsewhere. Thus, it makes sense to examine China’s commitment to its lauded principle,
to conduct a brief survey, the purpose of which is to examine the consistency with which
China has conducted itself in world affairs. These accounts, which focus primarily on the
Chinese approach towards the often politically questionable developing nations, will shed
light onto the reliability of Beijing’s word and to distinguish between its propagandist
proclamations and its actual diplomatic intentions, a subject that is sure to be of much
interest to those who have been keeping a close eye on China’s recent and rapid rise.
The second half of this investigation, beginning with the fourth section, brings it
back to China’s modern era, which henceforth shall be the term used to describe the post1949 period. The focus is on analyzing the political and strategic implications that the
marriage between the philosophies and principles has on the Party’s policy formation.
Geopolitics, examined as the military control of geographic space, will be utilized as a
method for analyzing international affairs, per George Friedman, and used to examine the
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core strategic territorial concerns that significantly shape Beijing’s political strategies.
This portion of the study will be dedicated to re-examining and re-defining the academic
realm of geopolitics from the Chinese perspective, and explore, once again, the relevance
of the Chinese experience with regards to protecting its territorial integrity. Especially
pertinent to this discussion are China’s persistent geo-strategic challenges, such as
Taiwan, which will be reevaluated in the wake of China’s rise as a great power and the
responsibilities that this new role may invoke. Similarly, a fresh perspective on China’s
geopolitical and geo-economic relations with other states may shed some light on
Chinese intentions in the defense sector, especially with regards to its ever-widening
defense budget as well as its plans for military and naval expansion.
The fifth section will examine and weigh in on the hotly contested issue of
democracy within China. The tenets of democracy, as established by centuries of Western
thought, will be examined hand-in-hand with applicability to Chinese society. By
focusing on the scope of interactions and actual power structure—as opposed to
perceived—between the governors and the governed, the concept of “democracy with
Chinese characteristics” will be proposed as a viable description of Chinese political
institutions; this will be explored from the grassroots level up to relations between
Beijing and its citizens. The power structures within the Party will also be briefly
explored, followed by an analysis of the Party’s approach to issues that challenge its grip
on power, such as social inequality and popular legitimacy.
The sixth and final segment will redirect the question of legitimacy towards
relations between China and the rest of the world. China’s so-called “charm offensive”
has already attracted much attention and interest, from both the advanced industrial states
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as well as the developing countries. While certain critics in the West are quick to
castigate China for its lack of ethical responsibility to the international community, much
of the rest of the world embraces the opportunity for financial assistance and muchneeded development aid without the bundle of pesky—and often intrusive—moral strings
frequently attached to Western deals. The trend has raised many concerned eyebrows
over the possibility of China usurping the American hegemonic throne by “purchasing”
friends abroad to support its quest for global domination. While the debate remains a
controversial albeit unresolved topic in world affairs, this study will focus on the
cultivation of Chinese legitimacy abroad, with much of Beijing’s international conduct
being heavily influenced by and in relatively strict accordance with the earlier established
pillars of its political culture.
Finally, in the concluding remarks, some light will be shed on the forecasting that
has been done by global analysts regarding the much discussed rise of China. Of
particular significance is the potential impact that growing Western influences and
ideologies may have on traditional Chinese values, and whether China’s distinctive
culture will be able to evolve and grow with modern trends for several more centuries or
be replaced by more contemporary and fashionable ideas in global political culture.
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I || SOCIAL TRADITIONS
Social philosophies have often played a very significant role in the formation and
structuring of political and civil societies throughout most of human history. Theological
doctrines rooted in the monotheistic religions as well as secular tenets such as democracy
and liberty are familiar building blocks that have given rise to many of the great empires
of Western history. It would be satisfactory to say that China’s political development
evolved in a very similar manner, with strong foundational roots in historical social
traditions, as the politics of governance were customarily viewed as an interaction
between the spiritual and the secular; however, in China, unlike in many of the Western
empires of the time, no official church or religion existed to compete with the state for
power. The typical approach to Chinese political theory is thus predicated on the
erroneous implications of this otherwise familiar basis, a method that involves utilizing
an inapplicable Western framework for investigating a distinctive and atypical
phenomenon.2
Unlike many other societies, the Chinese do not have a creation myth; the origin
of their people and country are accepted as a unquestioned reality, with all subsequent
creations, such as society and the values it espouses as being distinctly Chinese.3 Such a

2

Given the limited space allotted in this study, it is not the intent of the author to scrutinize or analyze
millennia of Chinese history in detail. For the purposes of establishing a methodological framework, an
extremely abbreviated discussion of aforementioned elements of Chinese history and culture will be
presented in the first half of the text. For a more robust and comprehensive narrative on Chinese history,
including more in-depth analysis, readers are referred to the following texts: This Is China: The First
5,000 Years. Haiwang Yuan, general ed. Knapp, Ronald G., Margot E. Landman, and Gregory Veeck,
eds. Great Barrington, Massachusetts: Berkshire Publishing, 2010.; Garnet, Jacques. A History of
Chinese Civilization. Trans. J.R. Foster and Charles Hartman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996.

3

Kissinger, Henry. On China. New York: Penguin, 2011. 13.
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self-centered view of the world is reflected in the naming of the Middle Kingdom
(Zh!ngguó), perceived to be the central—and most significant—point in the entire
world.4 Sino-centrism, with its strong belief in letting non-Chinese come to enjoy the
great wonders of China without the Chinese having to travel outside the kingdom to seek
external influences, thus forms a critical crux of modern China’s insistence on nonintervention in others’ internal affairs, an issue that will be further explored in section III
of this study.5 The absence of a specific creator figure does not denote a lack of
spirituality; rather, the entire social structure is based upon a divine Mandate from
Heaven that selects an exemplary leader to instruct those below him on the proper
behaviors and virtues.6
Confucianism, named for the philosophical thinker K"ng f#z$, arose early on to
become one of the first structural institutions for the organized study and development of
social philosophies in China,7 one that proved exceptionally durable and influential on

4

On this point, it is important to note that China did not perceive itself to be the only kingdom in the entire
world. The emperor and his subjects acknowledged the existence of other kingdoms, especially those
immediately in the Chinese periphery. However, given the prevailing Sino-centric attitude of the time,
these kingdoms were viewed as being obviously inferior to China but having the great fortune of being in
close proximity with such a superior and awesome power. As a result, China assumed a suzerain-vassal
relationship with its regional neighbors, believing that the desire of these countries to associate with
China would negate the need for the Middle Kingdom to export its cultures and values to others. Those
who did not wish to engage with China were disregarded as barbaric states that suffered a great loss by
opting for a supremely subpar lifestyle.

5

While China did view its surrounding states as vassals, the principle of non-intervention still applied, as it
did not seek to dominate its neighbors but allowed them a great level of autonomy that essentially
resembled complete independence.
6
As noted by Chad Hansen in his study on Confucian culture, the Mandate is “not a right to make laws and
punish people; it is a command to educate and shape people’s characters.” (Hansen, Chad. A Daoist
Theory of Chinese Thought: A Philosophical Interpretation. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.
61, 126.)
7

Ibid. 58.
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future cultural traditions.8 Due to its attributes and scope of influence on Chinese
civilization, Western scholars have often applied the misnomer of “religion” as a form of
classification. The term is placed in quotations because of its common academic usage as
a label for an institution of belief encompassing the worship of one or more deities, with
a heavy emphasis on theological rituals and texts. Though an informal belief in cosmic
elements such as demons and ancestral spirits did exist, Confucius concentrated his
teachings around compassionate rule, ritual performance, and proper conduct of familial
and civil duties to promote social harmony; if each individual were to follow the Way, or
dào, through learning his or her proper roles and responsibilities in society, chaos could
be mitigated or averted altogether;9 society was thus measured by “the sum of its roles,
not the sum of its individuals.”10 Since the emperor was the liaison between Heaven and
Earth, he was in the key position to maintain moral harmony and ensure the proper
adherence to the Way; it thus follows that the structure of traditional Chinese society is
often depicted as a hierarchical pyramid, with the emperor at the social pinnacle as the
divine link between Heaven and Earth.11 Despite the spiritual justification for social and
political power distribution, Confucianism emphasized that the ultimate goal of proper

8

Taoism, another social philosophy that referred to the core principles of social harmony and the Way
(dào), was also a very influential Chinese tradition that came about during this time. However, due to the
abbreviated nature of this study with regards to philosophical influences on modern Chinese political
culture, its focus is solely on Confucianism, which, incidentally, also incorporates many of the
fundamental elements of Taoism.

9

Eno, R. “The Doctrine of the Mean.” (2010): Unpublished manuscript. Indiana University.

10
11

Hansen, Chad. A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought: A Philosophical Interpretation. 62.
Hansen, Chad. A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought: A Philosophical Interpretation. 61.
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observation of rituals and virtuous behavior was to promote peace on earth, not to earn
any sort of assurances or benefits in the afterlife.12
One especially influential text that upholds much of the Confucian tradition and
presents it in a poetically didactic form is the Greater Learning (Dàxué).13 The text
consists of prosaic though deliberately rhymed verses, presumably to facilitate
memorization for the masses. The ultimate goal of the Greater Learning is to guide the
disciple towards the Way “in making bright virtue brilliant, in making the people new, in
dwelling at the limit of the good” via eight stages:
Those of antiquity who wished that all men throughout the
empire keep their inborn luminous Virtue unobscured put
governing their states well first; wishing to govern their
states well, they first established harmony in their
households; wishing to establish harmony in their
households, they first cultivated themselves; wishing to
cultivate themselves, they first set their minds in the right;
wishing to set their minds in the right, they first made their
thoughts true; wishing to make their thoughts true, they
first extended their knowledge to the utmost; the extension
of knowledge lies in fully apprehending the principle of
things… [once these have been accomplished in this order]
the empire becomes tranquil.14

12

According to The Analects, Confucius would only vaguely address the issue of spirits to emphasize his
teachings on people, in one passage (XI:11) asking his student Tzu-lu “Till you have learnt to serve men,
how can you serve ghosts?” and “Till you know about the living, how are you to know about the dead?”
(Confucius. The Analects of Confucius. Trans. Arthur Waley. New York: Vintage-Random House, 1989.
155.)
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The Greater Learning was published after Confucius’ death, presumably by one of his disciples, Zengzi.
While the text conveys many of what became the core ideologies of Confucianism following the
Master’s death, the interpretations presented by a new generation of neo-Confucians in Late Imperial
China may have deviated from the original intentions of the text. (Eno, R. “The Great Learning.” (2010):
Unpublished manuscript. Indiana University.)
14
Gardner, Daniel K. Chu Hsi and the Ta-hsueh: Neo-Confucian Reflection on the Confucian Canon.
Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1986. 91-4.
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As the leader of the state, the emperor was expected to remain impartial in his dealings,
lest he “be a disgrace in the eyes of the world.”15 Ideally, the emperor would best be able
to retain his grip on the state by measuring the minds of others and gaining the multitude
to maintain the Mandate.16 Confucianism stressed, above all, leadership through
instruction, stating that those who were unable to educate their own households would be
unfit to teach others.17 The emphasis on learning and education to preserve the prevailing
social order also undermined the role of the legal system, an institution Confucians
believed would “endanger the very root of the natural social order… [due to its]
interpretative ambiguities,… self-regarding motivations,… [and] the development of glib,
clever, aberrant use of language rather than conforming use;” the ultimate result would be
a criminal society with limited social motivations.18 As such, the emperor was heavily
discouraged from relying on experts for strategic or leisurely political pursuits, since this
type of behavior would obscure the path of the Way and “cause the common people
misfortune, unable to enjoy the best government.”19
Buddhism entered China in the first century CE and burgeoned from the age of
the Three Kingdoms (220-280 CE) to the Tang Dynasty (618-907 CE). Though
Buddhism experienced growth and popularity throughout China during this time, it never
achieved the widespread influence of its ancient Chinese predecessors. Ultimately, the
practice of Buddhism significantly declined following a massive persecution in 845 CE

15

Ibid. 115.

16

Ibid. 116.

17

Ibid. 110.

18

Hansen, Chad. A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought: A Philosophical Interpretation. 64-5.

19

Gardner, Daniel K. Chu Hsi and the Ta-hsueh: Neo-Confucian Reflection on the Confucian Canon. 84-5.
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by the emperor Wuzong. Despite its relatively short-lived era of glory in Chinese history,
Buddhism made important contributions to China’s growing traditions and institutions of
social thought. The practice of martial arts remained a seminal influence in Chinese
culture. Confucianism had incorporated some militaristic exercises in its education
curriculum for the morally superior man, including archery and charioteering. Taoist
forms of Chinese boxing had also previously existed as a form of combat skills training
involving the hands and feet to facilitate the use of weapons for defensive or offensive
purposes. In combining martial arts with religious practice, Buddhist monks, such as
those of the legendary Shaolin Monastery, were hailed for their superior fighting skills
and were often recruited by emperors for combat against foreign invaders; martial
training thus became highly encouraged as “a form of patriotic resistance to foreign
rule.”20 Despite an unconventional marriage between combat training with peaceful
religious practices, these two faces of Buddhism do not contradict one another. Unlike
many other major religions that advocate peace and nonviolence, Buddhism does not call
upon its followers to defend against enemies of faith, but does justify defensive
militaristic actions in the quest for global peace and freedom.21 As written by the
Venerable Dhammananda in What Buddhist Believe,

20

Henning, Stanley E. “The Chinese Martial Arts in Historical Perspective.” Military Affairs. 45.4. (1981):
173-6.
21
Buddhism fails to address or define situations of just warfare, suggesting that such concepts do not exist
in the Buddhist philosophy. War is considered akusala, often translated as “evil,” referring to acts that
lay the foundation for future suffering. This could be one of several plausible reasons accounting for the
absence of a Buddhist crusade in the present historic record. As mentioned previously, Buddhist monks,
who were recognized for their superior combat skills, were often hired by emperors to constitute a
fighting force against foreign enemies. According to Stephen Henning, they “represented the common
man’s way of uniting against lawlessness, oppressive government officials, and privileged foreigners”
(Henning, Stanley E. “The Chinese Martial Arts in Historical Perspective.” 176.). However, they
themselves were rarely the perpetrators of violence or aggression, observable via the nearly nonexistent
record of massive violent incidents instigated by Buddhism, especially in China; as its long history has
demonstrated, any occurrences tended to be the exception and not the rule.
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Buddhists should not be the aggressors even in protecting
their religion or anything else. They must try their best to
avoid any kind of violent act. Sometimes they may be
forced to go to war by others who do not respect the
concept of the brotherhood of humans as taught by the
Buddha. They may be called upon to defend their country
from external aggression, and as long as they have not
renounced the worldly life, they are duty-bound to join in
the struggle for peace and freedom. Under these
circumstances, they cannot be blamed for becoming
soldiers or being involved in defence… it is the duty of
every cultured person to find all possible ways and means
to settle disputes in a peaceful manner, without declaring
war to kill his or her fellow human beings.22
In general, the philosophy of Buddhism revolves around ideals such as kindness, mercy,
and tolerance, rather than focusing on certain rituals and rules, making it especially
compatible with the practice of Confucianism. The concept of nirvana, or Buddhist
enlightenment, was also extremely resonant with Confucian minds, as it strongly
mirrored the ultimate stage of mental illumination following years of diligent learning.23
As a result, Buddhism was readily accepted into mainstream social thought, ultimately
taking on a distinctive Chinese identity by integrating with Confucianism and Taoism to
form a unique philosophical hybrid.24
Over time, Buddhism and Taoism grew more relevant to personal spirituality,
while Confucianism retained the strongest grasp on Chinese governance and the
22

Dhammanada, K. Sri. What Buddhist Believe: Expanded 4th Edition. Kuala Lumpur: Buddhist
Missionary Society Malaysia, 2002. 383.

23

From Zhuxi’s annotations on Zengzi’s elucidation of “knowing the root” and “the completion of
knowledge” in Chapter V of Dàxué, he comments, “the first step of instruction in greater learning is to
teach the student, whenever he encounters anything at all in the world, to build upon what is already
known to him of principle and to probe still further, so that he seeks to reach the limit. After exerting
himself in this way for a long time, he will one day become enlightened… and the mind, in its whole
substance and vast operations, will be completely illuminated.” (Gardner, Daniel K. Chu Hsi and the Tahsueh: Neo-Confucian Reflection on the Confucian Canon. 104-5.)

24

“The Buddha and Buddhism: China.” Encyclopaedia Britannica. 1995. Accessed online 29 Jan 2012.
<http://online.sfsu.edu/~rone/Buddhism/Buddhism%20in%20China.htm>.
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development of its political values. As China reluctantly moved out of international
isolation after being forced into economic—and increasingly, militaristic—interactions
with other actors, emperors were advised to continue adhering to Confucian doctrines, as
“the foundation of an empire rests on propriety and righteousness, not on schemes and
stratagems [with] roots [lying] in the hearts of men, not skills and crafts.”25 The intellectbased meritocracy system, with its emphasis on a Confucian education, remained the key
institution that recruited bright minds for civil service positions.26 Until modern times, no
previous rulers had ever attempted to overthrow the Confucian value system; each
successive regime obediently governed by the ancient principles and accepted the
Mandate of Heaven, which established legitimacy for their rule. As one scholar notes, it
was ultimately this tradition that became the “mechanism of the process of Sinification
[and] established Confucianism as the governing doctrine of China.”27 Mao Zedong
became the first ruler to challenge convention directly, struggling to promote his own
philosophic vision of continuous revolution against the deeply embedded attitudes of his
people.28 In his opinion, it was the only way China could effectively break free from the
shackles of these outdated institutional philosophies and proceed to regain and rebuild
stature in the new world order. However, the tenacity of tradition proved resilient, as not
even Mao himself was immune to generations of established standards: armed with
25

Ch’en, Jerome. China and the West: Society and Culture, 1815-1937. Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1979. 429.

26

While the meritocracy system did tend to favor the aristocracy, filial piety is emphasized for those who
do not have the means for a formal Confucian education. As Zengzi points out in Dàxué Chapter IX, “to
govern the state well, it is necessary first to establish harmony in the household… no one is able to teach
others who cannot teach his own household… the superior man does not leave his household yet his
teachings are accomplished throughout the state.” (Gardner, Daniel K. Chu Hsi and the Ta-hsueh: NeoConfucian Reflection on the Confucian Canon. 110.)
27
Kissinger, Henry. On China. 91.
28

Ibid. 99.
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reliance on traditional ways, he expected the cohesion and steadfastness of the Chinese
people to endure and eventually overcome the social turbulence that he would unleash on
them. Even his Communist philosophy reflected many of the ancient Confucian
teachings, with his quest for egalitarianism based on the traditional principles of “each
man [diligently putting] forth his utmost effort” toward the greater cause of social
productivity.29
Even after decades of Maoist rule, the emphasis on education in leadership is still
prevalent in modern-day China; the focus is no longer strictly on Confucian principles
but more modern forms of learning, such as physical and social sciences. The selection of
two consecutive engineers (electric and hydraulic, respectively) to serve as hand-chosen
presidents of China may be viewed as coincidence, but with a chemical engineer—Xi
Jinping30—being the favored heir to Hu Jintao’s coveted position for Beijing’s new
politburo selection within the next year, mere happenstance is unlikely. As China persists
with economic growth and technological expansion, it stands to reason that men of
science, especially of engineering and technological sciences, have been selected to lead
the country in keeping up with modern industrialization and innovation. The avoidance of
socially-trained politicians or law scholars to lead an internationally burgeoning state is
certainly peculiar, especially in the Western world; however, this is completely in line
with established Confucian traditions, which call upon states to “gain by righteousness
and not by interest in gain.”31
29

Gardner, Daniel K. Chu Hsi and the Ta-hsueh: Neo-Confucian Reflection on the Confucian Canon. 81.

30

Fenby, Jonathan. “Xi Jinping: The man who will lead China into a new age.” The Guardian: The
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Recently, in light of China’s campaign for international legitimacy (to be
discussed in detail later on in Section VI), Beijing has put a lot of effort into making
Chinese culture fashionable and appealing to global audiences, whether via soft power
offensives abroad to project a positive image of its traditions, or by inviting foreigners
into its once-closed borders to experience Chinese culture firsthand. Given the significant
role of Confucianism in China’s history, it should come as no surprise that the social
philosophy has been revitalized and updated for international consumption: official
“Confucius Institutes” were founded in cities around the world, and a portion of the 2008
Beijing Olympics opening ceremony also acknowledged Confucian scholars. In January
of 2011, the Chinese paid homage to the respected thinker with a statue in Tiananmen
Square.32 Confucianism has also made a comeback in China’s national culture, including
a revival of Confucius studies in Chinese schools. As China reorients its academic society
in the aftermath of Mao’s reforms, growing domestic scholarship, coupled with foreign
intellectual interest have reignited focus on many of China’s most long-lasting traditions,
including its language, its Confucian culture, its rich history, and, in light of China’s
increasingly significant role in maintaining international peace and security, its enduring
military philosophies.
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II || MILITARY PHILOSOPHIES
Most Confucian teachings focus on governance and the responsibility of the emperor to
maintain the state; not much is written on the subject of war.33 The Master himself was
said to have considered war an evil that may be justified in certain situations as a
necessity, provided that “[the] army [is] entirely clear as to why it is fighting and
thoroughly convinced of the justice of its cause.”34 That being said, using the principles
and jargon of Chinese social philosophy, the concept of war can be viewed as a
developed adaptation to the realities of chaos, or luàn; a pragmatic response to the
absence of virtue and order. War thus follows the ebb and flow of Confucian cyclical
theory, where victory and defeat are not viewed as permanent states, but part of a greater
cosmic balance.35
With the recognized inevitability of chaos, Chinese philosophy had to adjust its
high moral standards to accommodate the restoration of order. Luo Guanzhong’s classic
epic from the fourteenth century CE, Romance of the Three Kingdoms (S%nguó y&nyì)
presents a Chinese twist on the age-old struggle between good and evil. Though the tale
33
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is classified as a work of historical fiction, it explores many of the prevailing themes that
Chinese philosophers at the time were struggling to elucidate, specifically the
justification of war within their Confucian moral framework. In the story, two main
characters are used to personify each side of the debate: Liu Bei, who represents the
paragon of Confucian virtue, and his counterpart, Cao Cao, who takes on a more
villainous role by defying morality with practicality. In one passage, as Liu Bei struggles
to maintain his faith and righteousness, his strategist, Pang Tong, attempts to temper his
master’s concerns with pragmatic advice:
Your words, my lord, are in accord with the principles of
heaven. Military force is not the only important thing—
except in a time of chaos (emphasis added). If you now
stubbornly adhere to eternal principles you will never
advance an inch. It is necessary to take a practical view:
annex the weak and attack the deluded, crush the aggressor
and protect the law-abiding. This is the Way… when the
business is settled the righteous may be rewarded and a
great country justly ruled (emphasis added). How can
this be a violation of faith? If we do not seize the day, we
will end up being seized ourselves by someone else.36
Pang Tong is therefore reasserting the moral validity of the ancient principles, yet points
out their lack of value in the real world.37 He and Cao Cao thus affirm the evilness of
chaos in accordance with Liu Bei’s beliefs, but recognize that only an individual who is
willing to violate moral standards can restore order, and consequently be commendable
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as an “admirable man.”38 However, it is to be noted that even in times of luàn, men are
still recognized as retaining autonomy over their own morality, so that they are held
responsible for their own actions, especially those that may contribute to the decay of
family authority or to the decline of the state; consequently, chaotic circumstances cannot
be used to legitimize immoral behavior, as those who attempt to do so will “come to
grief.”39
Aside from being a cultural literary jewel, Romance of the Three Kingdoms sheds
light on an important shift in Chinese political thought: the emergence of pragmatism as a
realistic counterweight to the moralistic ideals that have been practiced for centuries.
Force and moral harmony were now both acknowledged as necessary to maintain a stable
empire successfully, where limitations on the use of force were kept in check by the
virtues of Confucianism.40 The ancient philosophy still remained incredibly relevant, as a
safety net that prevented the collapse of the entire system to warfare and luàn.
For martial matters, the Chinese turned to The Art of War (B'ngf&), an ancient
manuscript that a military strategist named Sunzi was believed to have authored
sometime between the fifth and sixth century BCE. The pithy document is organized into
thirteen chapters, each with an emphasis on a particular aspect of warfare, with
invaluable military strategies for combat dispensed in short, bullet-point blurbs. It is often
referred to as one of the quintessential texts on military tactics, and its influence has
vastly expanded across time and space since its composition. However, it is of utmost
importance to underscore the notable absence of a theoretical framework that discusses
38
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the justification or morality of warfare. In the opening chapter, Sunzi does tip his hat at
the prevailing Chinese traditions, asserting that the art of war must be conducted by the
“wisdom, sincerely [sic], benevolence, courage, and strictness” of a commander who
fights for a sovereign embodying moral law, “[that which] causes the people to be in
complete accord with their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives,
undismayed by any danger.”41 The lack of space dedicated to military philosophy
suggests that Sunzi may have considered the justification of warfare outside the scope of
military leadership,42 relying on the divinely chosen emperor to wage battles only in
proper situations and with methods that do not violate his own moral codes.43
Nevertheless, The Art of War remains highly influential on modern Chinese
political strategy, especially in the realm of national security and military affairs. Unlike
other combat styles that revolve around martial rules of engagement or grandiose gestures
of strength to intimidate one’s opponent, Sunzi’s emphasis was on pragmatism:44 early on
in the text, he suggests that the ideal outcome of warfare should be “breaking the enemy’s
resistance without fighting.”45 If combat cannot be avoided, he urges generals to strive
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for rapidity in warfare,46 using an inexhaustible combination of direct and indirect tactics
to surround, attack, or divide the enemy, as to avoid prolonged costly engagements.47
There is little mention of reliance on weaponry; rather, Sunzi advises generals to obtain
foreknowledge of the opponent’s plans,48 and stresses the maintenance of a cohesive
army, and using a coordinated singular force to then crush one’s adversary.49 To
accomplish this, Sunzi borrows from the traditional Chinese values of filial piety,
likening the act of leading an army to that of ruling an empire. In passage IX:43-5, he
instructs generals not to abandon their humanity in their treatment of soldiers, despite the
necessary enforcement of discipline and obedience;50 the sentiment is later echoed in
passage X:25, where Sunzi emphasizes that cultivation of the army’s loyalty can only be
achieved by “regard[ing] your soldiers as your children.”51
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Textually, The Art of War reads like a typical manuscript on military tactics: there
are no overt differences that especially characterize Sunzi’s strategies as being
specifically Chinese in nature. However, when put into practice, the disparity becomes
much more obvious. A simple analogy suffices to highlight the subtle contrasts when one
compares culturally preferred strategy games: chess, for Westerners, and wéiqí (also
commonly referred to as go) for the Chinese. The term wéiqí literally translates as “chess
game of surrounding,” with each player moving to avoid encirclement by their foe.52
Given the Chinese penchant for taking the long view, it thus follows that such a strategy
would yield a continuously combative existence, where, as Sunzi cautions in passage
VIII:11, the Chinese should not “rely on the likelihood of the enemy not attacking, but
rather on the fact that [they] have made [their] position unassailable.”53
It was precisely this outlook that came to influence Mao Zedong, a Sunzi disciple,
in the shaping of his then inchoate theory of continuous revolution and his strategy to
rebuild China as a respectable world power. Mao’s seemingly contradictory agendas in
the post-1949 period followed the classic Sunzi technique of adopting unpredictable
strategies to prevent enemy foresight and defeat.54 These actions, though confusing to
Western observers, were not haphazardly constructed agendas, but the deliberate results
of strategic decision-making by the nascent Chinese Communist Party leadership. In
matters of security, the Chinese adopted a plan that would resonate familiarly with
scholars of Sunzi’s work as well as seasoned wéiqí players: “thorough analysis; careful
52
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preparation; attention to psychological and political factors; quest for surprise; and rapid
conclusion.”55 Incidentally, as many Western scholars are accustomed to an occidental
framework for analyzing the East, they are quick to misinterpret China’s political
maneuvers. Throughout the Cold War, China adopted a pragmatic military agenda that
focused on strongpoint defense against potential antagonist states, the emphasis being to
avoid encirclement by powerful states such as the Soviet Union and United States. The
fact that China was woefully ill-equipped to deal with its more muscular opponents was
something that Mao would neither admit nor allow his enemies to ascertain as an
advantage: his strategy thus successfully employed Sunzi’s favored method of dealing
psychological blows to discourage unwelcome aggression.56
That being the case, the Western concept of a grand chessboard, the catchphrase
popularized by Zbigniew Brzezinski’s eponymous work, does not really apply to China’s
approach to its national security affairs, as the Chinese are not in the habit of identifying
specific adversaries to checkmate. As has been discussed, China is very much aware that
its outdated weaponry systems and inferior military technologies are no match for
Western muscle, specifically against the superior strength of the United States. It would
be imprudent for China to openly engage in hostilities with other states, as defeat would
be sure, swift, and extremely costly. China’s advantage lies in its massive manpower, of
which tenacity and cohesion, as cultivated by Confucian virtues, are key. Much like in
wéiqí, China plays to its strengths by relying on a virtually limitless number of
indistinguishable players to secure victory through encirclement of enemy territory and
55
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exhaustion of its opponent’s resources while avoiding a similar fate for itself.57 The
world, therefore, is not so much China’s grand chessboard, as its grand wéiqí board, with
potentially hostile challengers all around, keeping China on guard and in a state of
perpetual combat.
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III || NON-INTERVENTION
Despite their differences, Confucianism and The Art of War synchronized harmoniously
to promote stability and relative peace within Chinese society for many centuries.
Conventionally, the former focused on each individual’s obligation to practice the
appropriate rituals to ensure harmony in the community. However, as one moves up the
hierarchy of social roles, the concept transitions seamlessly towards the latter philosophy,
from a peasant’s filial responsibilities of maintaining order within his household to the
emperor’s duty of preserving peace within his empire. Historical records reflect the royal
adaptation of these Confucian ideals to political agendas, in which emperors focused their
attention primarily on safeguarding and advancing their civilization without concerning
themselves too much about comingling with their international peers.58 The one major
overlap between these two major schools of thought, however, stemmed from this
glaringly myopic worldview that served only to address society as defined by China’s
territorial boundaries at the time. Given their nearly simultaneous emergences between
the fifth and sixth centuries BCE, the lack of scholarship dedicated to foreign enemies is
hardly surprising: the absence of significant military threats from any immediate
neighbors coupled with the prevailing Sino-centric attitude enabled a strict focus on
purely internal affairs. This is not to say that the Chinese were completely ignorant to the
existence of a world external to its borders or even beyond its seas, but these outsiders
were viewed as curious barbarians, rather than hostile militants.
And so, as the race for power and territory gained massive momentum in the
West, even wéiqí-inspired military strategies were unable to safeguard China’s territorial
58
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integrity and prevent forced occupation by outside actors. In fact, China’s heretofore lack
of meaningful interactions with the outside world likely contributed to its technological
inferiority and military backwardness, while the celebrated tenacity of its culture had
become somewhat of an Achilles’ heel for its slowness to adapt to a rapidly changing
global order. The resulting “century of humiliation” (b&inián guóch$) by the Western
world and Japan, as coined by Communist propagandists in the 1920s, proved to be a
bitter pill that the Chinese were forced to swallow, its taste still lingering unpleasantly
upon the national palate to this day. Despite the shame, the experience left another lasting
legacy especially significant to the development of modern Chinese political culture: a
foundation for non-intervention as a principle for China’s conduct of international affairs.
After centuries of isolation,59 China only very reluctantly opened up to the
international arena in the years following the end of World War II. However, the lessons
of its past interactions with the outside world had left a deep wound on the spirit of the
Chinese people, a sentiment that Mao reiterated with his commitment to national
autonomy and self-sufficiency. Even with China’s initial reliance on the Soviet Union as
an established ally in the emerging ideological battlefield, the relationship quickly
crumbled as the partnership began to progress from a simple ideological compatibility
towards a more involved geostrategic alliance. The mere suggestion of compromising
Chinese sovereignty for the mutual benefit of both parties infuriated Mao: in his
memoirs, Khrushchev recalled an incident in 1958 regarding a Soviet proposal to allow
59
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Chinese access to Soviet submarine bases in the Arctic Ocean in exchange for Soviet
access to China’s Pacific ports; Mao responded rather vehemently to the request, telling
Khrushchev that, “We’ve had the British and other foreigners on our territory for years
now, and we’re not ever going to let anyone use our land for their own purposes again.”60
Mao’s firm stance on preserving his country’s territorial integrity eventually evolved into
a core value of Chinese political culture, specifically in the realm of military security:
“Every country should keep its armed forces on its own territory and no one else’s.”61
Mao realized that for China not only to restore itself to its former splendor, but
also to garner world recognition and respect for its greatness, his Party would have to
focus its efforts on rebuilding the state internally with whatever limited resources were
available. Despite his highly unpopular—not to mention extremely casualty-ridden and
socioeconomically destructive—efforts to incite continuous revolution, one element of
Mao’s strategy did emerge as a pragmatic guideline for China’s future attitude in
international affairs: taking the “long view” in political matters by shifting focus to
achieving domestic stability and advancement, without being too preoccupied with
external affairs, aside from direct threats to national security.62 The logic behind the
broader vision stemmed from reciprocity: China would play nice with those who treated
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it with respect and equality while returning the favor;63 later on in history, in the
aftermath of the Tiananmen Square incident, Party ideologist Li Ruihuan reiterated these
sentiments to former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger:
Since 1840 the Chinese people have been subjected to
foreign bullying; it was a semi-feudal society then… Mao
fought all of his life to say that China should be friendly to
countries that treat us with equality. In 1949 Mao said “the
Chinese people have stood up.” By standing up he meant
the Chinese people were going to enjoy equality with other
nations. We don’t like to hear that others ask us what to do.
But Americans tend to like to ask others to do this or that.
The Chinese people do not want to yield to the instructions
of others.64
Even in the realm of great power politics, China was determined not to let ideological
differences block pragmatic cooperation with the opposing side; during a conversation on
February 22, 1972, between Prime Minister Zhou Enlai and President Richard Nixon, the
former points out, “Of course, the world outlook of our two sides are different, basically
different, which we do not cover up. But that should not hinder state relations between
our two countries from moving toward normalacy [sic].”65
To this point, one may look at Chinese participation in the Korean War and
Vietnam War as examples of hypocrisy, where Beijing’s rhetoric does not match up with
its actions. However, a closer examination of the historical record reveals that the
Chinese leadership at the time had exercised extreme restraint to intervene in these
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affairs, only taking actions deemed as necessary responses to foreign compulsion.66
During an interview with American journalist Edgar Snow in January 1965, Mao
reiterated his focus on managing the internal affairs of his country, noting that “fighting
beyond one’s own borders was criminal.”67 In the event of a military standoff, he
unequivocally stated his intention to contain Chinese actions within its own borders, and
that China would not face off with the United States in Vietnam unless otherwise
provoked. Even as the two superpowers began contemplating cooperation in Vietnam
during the Nixon administration, China remained adamant on retaining room to maneuver
autonomously: in conversations with then National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger,
Mao explicitly refused to “make [China’s] cooperation conditional on the cooperation of
others,” opting instead for “parallel strategies [as] the bond would be common
convictions, not formal obligations;”68 as expected in the spirit of Chinese pragmatism,
China’s actions would take its own interests into careful consideration but it would not
act under any other formal obligations or on the interests of anyone else.
A collective empirical sample of China’s dedication to its non-interventionist
principle lies in its voting record as a permanent member on the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC), a position it has secured since November 25, 1971. As of early
February 2012, China had abstained 119 times on 1726 resolutions and exercised a
66
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negative vote seven times.69 Of the seven vetoes, five were cast with an eye to precluding
interventionism: specifically in Macedonia, Myanmar, Zimbabwe, the Middle East, and
most recently, Syria. In speaking with the United Nations Department of Public
Information, Chinese representatives had steadfastly defended their national policy of
non-intervention in another country’s internal affairs, maintaining that the role of the
international community is to provide “constructive assistance” or advice on any issues
that do not threaten international peace or security, and that the UN needs to heed the
limitations dictated by its Charter and respect each country’s sovereignty, independence,
and territorial integrity.70 As noted by Li Baodong, China’s representative on the UNSC
since 2010, in the aftermath of a defeated draft resolution regarding violence in Syria in
October 2011, China’s position on principles of intervention had remained “consistent
and firm.”71
Usually, China takes a resolved third-world stance while trying to frustrate
Western consensus at the expense of the developing world, often viewing the United
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States as its main opponent in the metaphorical UNSC boxing ring.72 In the case of gross
violations by a state against its people, China did concede that limited intervention may
be necessary, albeit reserved for concerned parties and local or regional institutions.73
Though the Chinese have frequently opposed “the arbitrary use of sanctions,” they have
never disapproved of the notion entirely, nor have they ever promised allies to prevent
the UNSC from imposing them on a member state.74 However, the Chinese are still
especially sensitive to the authorization of sanctions or the use of force, having expressed
concern that international involvement would exacerbate an already grave situation at the
expense of innocent people,75 rather than the government, as the intended recipient of
such punitive actions.76 That being said, China does not exercise its veto lightly or in a
haphazard manner;77 as the statistics demonstrate, more often than not, it chooses
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quoted as saying “”Past experience shows that sanctions could not reach the expected results and
victimized the civilian population.” (U.N. Security Council, 5423rd Session. “Security Council Imposes
Travel, Financial Sanctions on 4 Sudanese, Adopting Resolution 1672 (2006) By 12-0-3.” (SC/8700).
New York: Department of Public Information, News and Media Divisions. 25 Apr. 2006.
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A newly minted China exercised its first veto on August 25, 1972 regarding the admission of Bangladesh
to the UN, an action that the Chinese have already admitted as being motivated more by myopic
interests—in this case, relations with Pakistan—than by traditional Chinese political values. Bangladesh
was admitted two years later without any opposition from a severely embarrassed China. Since then,
China has restrained its use of the veto for matters it considers to be part of a state’s internal agenda, does
not exhibit any immediate threat to international peace or security, or has shown promise or progress for
being addressed locally or regionally.
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abstention and non-voting to casting a negative vote;78 this behavior is meant to send a
message to its international peers on China’s stance without directly taking sides or
alienating allies.79
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Bailey, Sydney D. “New Light on Abstentions in the UN Security Council.” International Affairs (Royal
Institute of International Affairs 1944-). 50.4. (1974): 572.
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At this point, it is necessary to include a brief discussion regarding China’s voting behavior on three key
pieces of legislation from the UNSC: Resolutions 678 and 1973, as well as defeated draft resolution
S/10536. China had abstained from voting on 678 and 1973, both of which had invoked the UN Charter’s
Chapter VII clause to authorize “all necessary actions” to address and resolve international crises in Iraq
and Libya respectively. Though such behavior does not necessarily correspond with China’s noninterventionist rhetoric, China’s abstention on UNSCR 678 has been widely attributed to its
unwillingness to further alienate relations with the West, especially the United States, in the aftermath of
the Tiananmen Square incident. In contrast, China had not experienced any major public fallout with the
international community in 2011-2012, prompting questions as to why China chose to abstain from
voting on UNSCR 1973 while vetoing—and consequently strongly alienating Western allies—the draft
resolution on Syria in February 2012. The supposed “inconsistency” has a rather logical line of
reasoning, based on Chinese rhetoric following UNSCR 1973 and its inherent geopolitical concerns.
Foreign ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu commented on the abstention in a statement, saying “[China]
oppose[s] the use of force in international relations and have some serious reservations with part of the
resolution,” urging the UN to exercise restraint, and to respect the sovereignty and integrity of Libya
under the its Charter and international laws. (Dasgupta, Saibal. “China opposed UN resolution on Libya.”
The Times of India. 18 Mar 2011. 10 Feb 2012. <http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-0318/china/ 29144182_1_libya-resolution-countries>.) Though China has not released official statements
explicitly expressing displeasure at how the West—via the UN—has dealt with the situation in Libya, its
vetoes for both draft resolutions on Syria is a clear indication as to its stance on UN action thus far—
presumably, it is unhappy that the UN has overstepped its Charter limitations and once again,
demonstrated an inability to restrain itself when intervening in the internal issues of a member state.
Excessive UN meddling in Syria also creates a prominent geostrategic concern for China, as the latter
views the Middle Eastern state as a gateway to Iran, which then presents a foothold for Western powers
to gain military influence in the Eastern sphere to directly challenge China and Russia. Though China
had numerous interests and investments in Libya, the North African state presented less of geopolitical
liability than Syria and thus proved an apt “testing ground,” so to speak, to assess the integrity of the
Western word, via UNSCR 1973. With Syria, it seems that China is unwilling to risk a strategic misstep
by inviting Western powers into its backyard, thus choosing to veto the drafted resolutions. It is,
however, willing to pursue alternative initiatives for peace, including a presidential statement
acknowledging the political transition in Syria and UNSC commitment to end the violence there, as
necessary. (Besheer, Margaret. “UN Security Council Backs Envoy’s Peace Plan for Syria.” Voice of
America. 22 Mar 2012. 22 Mar 2012. <http://www.voanews.com/english/news/middle-east/UN-SecurityCouncil-Endorses-Syria-Peace-Plan-143643006.html>.; CNN Wire Staff. “China issues framework for
settling
Syrian
crisis.”
CNN.
03
Mar
2012.
03
Mar
2012.
<http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/03/world/meast/syria-china/>.) Though various news sources reported on
the “disgust” of Western states following the veto on February 4, 2012, one Arab news source, Jadaliyya,
presented a contrasting list of the American vetoes during the same period (1972-2011), highlighting
some similar atrocities that the United States had negatively cast aside during previous UNSC meetings,
despite vehemently castigating China for its decision on S/10536. (Haddad, Bassam. “US on UN Veto:
‘Disgusting”, ‘Shameful’, ‘Deplorable’, ‘a Travesty’…Really?” Jadaliyya. 05 Feb 2012. 05 Feb 2012.
<http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/4237/us-on-un-veto_disgusting-shameful-deplorable-a-tra>.)
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In November of 1989, Deng Xiaoping, former leader of the Party, proposed his
vision for “the establishment of a new international political order,” consisting of “five
principles of peaceful coexistence,” one of which would officially establish nonintervention in the domestic affairs of another state as a core principle of foreign policy.80
As Western outrage over Tiananmen reintroduced fears of a new ideological battle with
China following Soviet demise, newly elected leader Jiang Zemin calmly reiterated
China’s resolute principles, assuring the United States, “We do not export revolution. But
the social system of each country must be chosen by that country.”81 As China began to
emerge prominently as a global financial heavy-hitter, it did not allow its economic
success to interfere with its political agenda, believing that the positive results of its
development strategy will naturally attract allies and admirers. Of Deng’s advice to future
generations of Chinese leaders,82 two points are especially pertinent to this crucial aspect
of Chinese foreign policy: (4) t%ogu%ng y&nghuì – avoid the limelight; and (5) shànyú
sh"uzhu! – keep a low profile. In this way, China would assuredly strengthen its relations
with all of its global partners without simultaneously alienating any potential allies. Even
as China continues to expand its global influence, it still demonstrates little interest in
shaping global civilization, opting instead to focus on advancing Chinese civilization.83
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Kissinger, Henry. On China. 427.
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Ibid. 451.
Deng Xiaoping’s famous twenty-eight characters, as translated by Kishore Mahbubani, refer to Deng’s
vision for China’s development: 1) l(ngjìng gu%nchá – observe and analyze [developments] calmly; 2)
chénzhuó yìngfù – deal [with changes] patiently and confidently; 3) w(nzhù zhènji&o – secure [our own]
position; 4) t%ogu%ng y&nghuì – conceal [our] capabilities and avoid the limelight; 5) shànyú sh"uzhu! –
be good at keeping a low profile; 6) juébù d%ngtóu – never become a leader; and 7) y"usu" zuòwéi –
strive to make achievements. (Mahbubani, Kishore. The New Asian Hemisphere. 223-4.)
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In a separate article, Mahbubani observes that, “Each time a new problem surfaces, China looks for
advantage in it, assuming that it must adapt to the world, not shape the world as it wishes.” (Mahbubani,
Kishore. “Smart Power, Chinese Style.” The American Interest Magazine. Mar/Apr 2008. 1 Feb 2012.
<http://www.the-american-interest.com/article-bd.cfm?piece=406>.)
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IV || GEO-STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
From the various notable moments that punctuate China’s multi-millennial history, most
scholars agree that the revolution of 1949 is the single most significant event in its
contemporary historical period, as the collection of tumultuous internal changes played a
pivotal role in propelling China’s political culture towards a new modern age
domestically and abroad. However, while the government endured dramatic changes to
its dynastic legacy and methods of governance, including a complete reformatting of its
leadership system, the fundamental values of Chinese political culture remained largely
intact, merely undergoing an adaptive facelift for China’s modern era. Of China’s various
historical institutions, three have been identified as salient pillars for the development of
its political culture: social traditions, military philosophies, and the principle of nonintervention. While it may be convenient to relegate the study of such ideologies to the
realm of esoteric academic inquiry, it is essential to have at least a basic grasp of these
concepts so that one may formulate a new theoretical foundation much more suitable for
the observation and analysis of China’s political conduct. Therefore, the latter half of this
study will shift focus to the application of these conventional values to several aspects of
modern China’s political agenda—specifically in the realms of its geopolitical security,84
its gradual evolution towards “democracy with Chinese characteristics,” and its so-called
“charm offensive” to establish international legitimacy—and the implications that its
policies may have, both on the domestic level and within the international sphere.
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In Western scholarship, the term geopolitics stems from the Halford J. Mackinder’s original theory from
the early 20th century, referring to a territory-based strategy for Western military domination of Eurasia
while curtailing Russian and Chinese influences within the region. However, in this study, I deviate from
the Mackinderian usage, and use the term simply to convey a military and/or political control of
geographic space.
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China’s debut in the postwar era occurred at a crucial moment, as the traditional
balance of power was expanding towards new frontiers on either side. Though it had no
victorious bragging rights from the war, China’s copious amounts of territory and
manpower, combined with a radical change in ideology, gave it the makings of a
formidable foe in the new world order. However, fresh off the heels of a stunning victory
against the Guómínd!ng (GMD),85 the Party prioritized its focus not so much on securing
global influence as it did on restoring internal stability—in accordance with classic
Confucian principles86—and warding off potential threats on its periphery by establishing
international credibility.87 Though the moniker of the nascent war may have referred to
the absence of direct military confrontation between the major superpowers, China was
not ignorant to the reality that proxy wars were being waged by the United States and the
Soviet Union around the world. Being a prominent neighbor of the USSR put China in a
precarious position, both with its predominant ideological ally and enemy; thus, China’s
main geopolitical concern88 has always been, and continues to be, avoiding
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For an insightful discussion on the geopolitics of the Party during the revolution, please refer to Jieli Li’s
study, “Geopolitics of the Chinese Communist Party in the Twentieth Century.” (Sociological
Perspectives. 36.4. (1993): 317-24.)
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In The Analects XIII:13, Confucius notes, “Once a man has contrived to put himself aright, he will find
no difficulty at all in filling any government post. But if he cannot put himself aright, how can he hope to
succeed in putting others aright?” As Arthur Waley comments, this verse employs a play on words with
zhèng, which can mean both “to straighten, to put right” and “to govern.” (Confucius. The Analects of
Confucius. Trans. Arthur Waley. 174.)
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The Party was well aware of the fact that it was unquestionably ill-equipped to confront any of its
adversaries directly, that its only means to “challenge the prevailing international order [was by]
ideological means.” (Kissinger, Henry. On China. 99.)
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For the purposes of this study, an abbreviated selection of China’s security interests are highlighted to
demonstrate the cohesiveness of its geopolitical strategy with its traditional political values. Prominent
areas of concern that are not discussed extensively include India, Japan, the Middle East, South Asia,
South Korea, Southeast Asia, and Tibet.
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encirclement89 by potentially hostile powers, specifically the United States and the Soviet
Union (and subsequently, the Russian Federation in the post-Cold War period).
Though the United States is not usually identified as a colonizing power in the
traditional sense of the term, its quest for global influence in conjunction with its viable
network of military and economic alliances has presented a familiar threat to many
regional powers, including China. In the immediate postwar period, the United States had
maintained a dominating presence in China’s backyard, particularly along the eastern and
southern borders, frustrating Chinese attempts to expand its influence throughout these
areas.90 While both sides have made overt reassurances not to invade the other side
directly,91 tensions remained high as the Americans maintained close military ties with
Japan, South Korea,92 and the Philippines, amongst others.93 Since 1949, Beijing’s
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A common misinterpretation amongst Western and Chinese strategists that has been especially prominent
in the postwar era occurs “when the Chinese… [encounter] the Western concept of deterrence [and] a
vicious circle [results]: acts conceived as defense in China may be treated as aggressive by the outside
world; deterrent moves by the West may be interpreted in China as encirclement.” (Kissinger, Henry. On
China. 134.)
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Li, Jieli. “Geopolitics of the Chinese Communist Party in the Twentieth Century.” 324.
As Chairman Mao relayed to President Nixon during their secret meeting in February of 1972, “At the
present time, the question of aggression from the United States or aggression from China is relatively
small… a state of war does not exist between our two countries. You want to withdraw some of your
troops back on your soil; ours do not go abroad.” (USC-US China Institute. “Memorandum of
Conversation: Peking, February 21, 1972, 2:50-3:55 p.m.” 02 Feb 2012.
<http://china.usc.edu/ShowArticle.aspx?articleID=2248>.) The Shanghai Communiqué, which
summarized the meeting between the American and Chinese leaders, reaffirmed these principles with an
article that read, “Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts
by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.” (U.S. Department of State.
Office of the Historian. “Joint Statement Following Discussions with Leaders of the People’s Republic of
China.” Shanghai, February 27, 1972. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976. XVII, China
1969-1972, Document 203.)
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Joint military exercises with South Korea involving stimulated war-like events have been conducted
annually since 1994. (“South Korea and US to hold joint military exercise.” The Independent. 11 Apr
2001. 20 Feb 2012. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/south-korea-and-us-to-hold-jointmilitary-exercise-753360.html>.)
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For a more detailed discussion regarding the extent of joint military exercises being conducted by the
United States in the Asia-Pacific sphere, please refer to Wen Jiabo’s essay, entitled “Joint Military
Exercises: The World Knows America’s True Intentions” (Trans. Brian Tawney. Watching America. 13
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greatest challenge had always been pecuniary in nature, centered around figuring out a
balance between expensive geopolitical expenditures and crucial internal developments;94
as a result, the Chinese leadership relied on centuries of traditional pragmatic wisdom to
guide the formation of its foreign policy and security agenda. Military threats were
prioritized accordingly based on proximity to its borders,95 likelihood to occur within a
specified time frame,96 and severity of the perceived danger; China was, and remains,
especially sensitive to tension along its western and southern borders as well as across the
Taiwan Strait.
Taiwan remains one of China’s most enduring geostrategic challenges, its
ambiguous status as a state notwithstanding.97 Throughout conversations with U.S.
Feb 2012. 13 Feb 2012. <http://watchingamerica.com/News/142767/joint-military-exercises-the-worldknows-america’s-true-intentions/>.) and Chinese Military’s article from February 7, 2012 (“US-led AsiaPacific’s largest joint military exercise to prove safety in China.” Chinese Military. 7 Feb 2012. 13 Feb
2012. <http://www.cnmilitary.info/us-led-asia-pacifics-largest-joint-military-exercise-to-prove-safety-inchina/>.)
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Li, Jieli. “Geopolitics of the Chinese Communist Party in the Twentieth Century.” 325.
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A prime historical example of this occurred in 1860, when the Chinese were engaged in hostilities with
the British and the Russians in the aftermath of internal rebellions in Taiping and Nien. The British were
aggressive in their pursuit for a permanent embassy in Beijing, though the Chinese had major
reservations regarding foreign presence on their soil. However, despite the insistence of the British, the
Chinese de-prioritized the Anglo threat, opting to focus instead on their northern neighbor, believed to be
“aiming to nibble away our territory like a silk worm.” (Fairbank, John K. and Ss"-yü Têng. China’s
Response to the West: A Documentary Survey, 1839-1923. Harvard University Press, 1954. 48.)
96
The Chinese commitment to the long view includes avoiding time pressure: in The Analects XIII:17,
Confucius advises “Do not try to hurry things. Ignore minor considerations. If you hurry things, your
personality will not come into play. If you let yourself be distracted by minor considerations, nothing
important will ever get finished” (Confucius. The Analects of Confucius. Trans. Arthur Waley. 175.)
They are not inclined to make hasty decisions, opting to make comprehensive observations to discern
long-term patterns and behaviors, which are then used to determine actions in the short run. Time is not
measured in “political quantities”, such as by length of administrations or the lifespan of a certain leader;
therefore, it is less imperative for a particular goal to be achieved right this moment, so long as it will be
achieved at some point in the future.
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According to Article 2 of the “Law of the PRC on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone” adopted by
the People’s Congress in February 1992, China recognizes Taiwan as a legal entity of Beijing’s territory.
(Ministry of National Defense. The People’s Republic of China. “Law of the PRC on the Territorial Sea
and Contiguous Zone.” 20 Apr 2006. 13 Oct 2011.
<http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/Regulations/2006-04/20/content_4007735.htm>.)
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leadership in the early 1970s, Mao and Zhou repeatedly dismissed the Taiwanese issue at
hand, telling the Americans in 1973 that, “We can do without Taiwan for the time being,
and let it come after one hundred years.”98 However, Taiwan’s insistence on sovereignty,
spurred in part by persistent resentment following the revolution, and in part by American
determination to establish a rivaling sphere of influence in the area,99 has created
significant geopolitical concerns for the Party. Repeated U.S. military engagements in the
Taiwan Straits (specifically during the three crises of 1954-5, 1958, and 1995-6
respectively) have undoubtedly intensified Chinese determination to maintain political
control, if not only in name, over the island nation. For the past six decades, Beijing has
been content with granting Taipei a flexible—albeit conditional—right to self-
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U.S. Department of State. Office of the Historian. “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, November
12, 1973, 5:40-8:25 p.m.” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976. XVIII, China 1973-1976,
Document 58.
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As of January 1, 1979, the United States has agreed to recognition of Beijing as the sole legal
government of one China, but insists on maintaining relations with Taiwan within that context (per the
second joint communiqué between the two countries). However, relations between the three countries
have remained persistently rocky, hindering complete normalization on all three fronts. The United States
has consistently declared its determination to oversee a peaceful resolution for the contending debate
over sovereignty between China and Taiwan, in spite of Mao’s predictions for a violent conflict between
the latter two sometime in the future. The Chinese have not reacted positively to U.S. involvement in
cross-strait affairs, since they see the issue as being domestic thus not warranting international
engagement. Though the United States argues that its interactions with Taiwan have been in accord with
the Taiwan-Relations Act of 1979 and do not violate the tenets of the third joint communiqué, signed on
August 17, 1982, the unofficial relationship between the two countries have highly irritated Beijing,
especially with regards to continued U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Per the U.S. Department of State’s
country profile on Taiwan, “the Taiwan Relations Act continues to provide the legal basis for the
unofficial relationship between the U.S. and Taiwan, and enshrines the U.S. commitment to assisting
Taiwan maintain [sic] its defense capability,” raising Chinese suspicions regarding the euphemisms
describing what seems to be a reversion to a military alliance between the United States and Taiwan
against China; if this is indeed the case, this would be a gross violation of Chinese sovereignty, territorial
integrity, and the conditions for normalization of relations jointly agreed to by both states via the
communiqués. The USDOS profile also cites specific statistics on weapons acquisition between the
United States and Taiwan, claiming that American intent, in January 2010, to “sell Taiwan $6.4 billion
worth of various defensive weapons, including Blackhawk helicopters and Patriot missiles, and… an
additional $5.8 billion in September 2011” was “consistent with Taiwan’s reliance on the U.S. for major
weapons systems.” (U.S. Department of State. Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. “Background
Note: Taiwan.” 08 Feb 2012. 21 Feb 2012. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35855.htm>.)
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government, much like its stance towards Hong Kong since 1997.100 However, as long as
the United States continues to be active (and at times, with bellicose overtones) in the
area, it would be impractical for China to recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state: an
American-Taiwanese alliance would be virtually guaranteed, as the smaller country
would presumably seek protection from potential Chinese bullying from the world’s sole
hegemon,101 presenting a severe threat to China only 140 miles from its borders; this
would only exacerbate an already menacing American presence in the Asian-Pacific
region. Such a move would be extremely detrimental to China’s wéiqí strategy, as it
would complete the American encirclement on the eastern front.102 As a result, to this
day, Beijing and Taipei continue to engage in an incessant jostling for international
legitimacy.103
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An article by Taipei-based journalist Jens Kastner in the Asia Times reveals some of the outstanding
issues regarding granting Taiwan status as a Special Administrative Region, under Deng Xiaoping’s “one
country, two systems” doctrine. (Kastner, Jens. “China blocks Hong Kong-Taiwan embrace.” Asia Times
Online. 16 Feb 2012. 16 Feb 2012. <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/NB16Ad01.html>.)
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In a candid conversation with Henry Kissinger, former Chinese President Jiang Zemin voiced his doubts
on “whether China and the U.S. can find common language and resolve the Taiwan question,”
acknowledging his past remarks “that if Taiwan were not under U.S. protection (emphasis added),
[China] would have been able to liberate it.” (Kissinger, Henry. On China. 484.)
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In the post-Cold War period, scholars generally agree that the United States has become China’s greatest
adversary politically and economically, as it maintains various military alliances with China’s
neighboring regions, including Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, and, in an
economic capacity, Russia. (Sheives, Kevin. “China Turns West: Beijing’s Contemporary Strategy
Towards Central Asia.” Pacific Affairs. 79.2. (2006): 219.)
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A prominent example of this rivalry is through claiming bragging rights for emerging Chinese cultural
icons, such as the U.S. basketball player Jeremy Lin or international fashion designer Jason Wu. As there
have not yet been many prominent Asians of Chinese or Taiwanese descent that have attained worldwide
megastardom, cultural clashes inevitably occur during such rare occasions. Especially relevant to this
discussion is Taiwan’s ambiguous status, which it struggles to secure by seeking international
recognition of its citizens’ achievements, especially in the sports, arts, and entertainment field. (Mozur,
Paul and Hsu, Jenny W. “China, Taiwan Both Lay Claim to Jeremy Lin.” The Wall Street Journal. 15
Feb 2012. 15 Feb 2012.
<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204792404577225010369633998.html?mod=googlen
ews_wsj>.; “Fashion designer Wu credits Taiwan for his success.” Taiwan Today. 08 Oct 2010. 15 Feb
2012.
<http://www.taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem=12 1416&ctNode=445>.)
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Another crucial geopolitical pivot point is in the Central Asian theatre, an area
that China has previously shown limited interest due to its instability, internal issues, as
well as its proximity to the USSR during the Cold War era. However, in the aftermath of
Soviet collapse, China has shown significant interest in the area for predominantly geostrategic and geo-economic reasons. China’s nearly 2,100-mile border with three Central
Asian states on its western side is of notable significance, as China’s western provinces
have traditionally been riddled with turbulence, due to ethno-political instability, and
more recently, economic disparities resulting from uneven levels of development
throughout the country in the postwar period. Of utmost concern have been the separatist
sentiments that have arisen due to increasing influences of Pan-Turkic nationalism in
neighboring states,104 which Beijing point to as instigators for Uighur unrest in its
northwestern Xinjiang province. The persistent volatility of the region has also proved
counterproductive to the Party’s development plans for its western provinces, as the
ongoing violence acts as an active deterrent for potential investors and tourists. An
additional concern has emerged since the 2001 War on Terror, as the United States, using
the international legitimacy it secured post-9/11, began to pursue an aggressive campaign
for its presence in Central Asia, predominantly through the establishment of military
bases.105 From China’s perspective, U.S. meddling disrupts a lot of the goodwill

104

As Kevin Sheives notes in his study, many of the Uighur from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan offer a
significant measure of moral support for their Xinjiang brethren, relying primarily on kinship
connections. The Central Asian Uighur diaspora communities also rally international support to pressure
the Chinese government to allow greater Uighur autonomy in Xinjiang. (Sheives, Kevin. “China Turns
West: Beijing’s Contemporary Strategy Towards Central Asia.” 209.)
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Some of the Central Asian states, notably Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, have attempted to rid their
countries of U.S. military presence. However, in most cases, the United States has used financial
incentives, such as doubled or trebled financial aid in exchange for retaining their bases in these
countries. In July 2005, a presumably Uzbek-led motion (also called the “Astana declaration”)
established a timeline for the United States to remove their troops, an action that the Americans, at the
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measures taken by the Chinese (via the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, or SCO, to
be discussed in more detail later in this section) by bolstering Central Asian suspicion and
opposition against Russia, China, and Iran;106 especially irritating are American
expectations of being the “ultimate arbiter” of regional affairs in an area the Chinese
consider to be in their backyard.107 While Washington has repeatedly assured Beijing that
it has no desire for a permanent military presence in the region, the Chinese view the
American presence as a formidable threat to its military security, via encirclement on the
western front.108
In lieu of military force, China has opted for multilateral cooperation109 with the
Central Asian states to tackle the issues of instability in the region, often referred to as the
time, had mistakenly attributed to Chinese and Russian displeasure. (Ibid. 220-1.) Despite a forced
eviction in 2005, U.S. troops were allowed to resend troops to Uzbekistan in 2008. (“US troops returning
to Uzbek base.” BBC News. 06 Mar 2008.
02 Nov 2011. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asiapacific/7280538.stm>.). In November 2011, Kyrgyzstan’s newly elected president, Almazbek
Atambayev stated that his country will not renew the lease for the American military base at Manas
Airport when it expires in 2014. (Schwirtz, Michael. “Kyrgyzstan Says United States’ Manas Air Base
Will Close.” The New York Times. 01 Nov 2011. 02 Nov 2011.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/02/world/asia/kyrgyzstan-says-united-states-manas-air-base-willclose.html?_r=1>.)
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Chung, Chien-peng. “The Shanghai Co-operation Organization: China’s Changing Influence in Central
Asia.” The China Quarterly. 180. (2004): 997.
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Brzezinski, Zbigniew. The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives.
New York: Basic Books, 1997. 123-4.
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The Chinese are acutely aware of the United States’ strategic interest to destabilize the Party regime,
potentially via ethno-religious conflicts in China, since Beijing has consistently frustrated the progress of
the global democratic movement via various channels, such as UNSC voting, while Washington has
made nondemocratic regime change a core principle of its foreign policy agenda. As Nyima Tsering,
China’s Deputy Governor of Tibet points out, “Some people with insidious aims use religion to carry out
activities to overthrow, to split China. Such things do happen. So we must heighten our vigilance. If you
use religion as a cover to try to split China or harm national security, then you’re breaking the law. It’s
not allowed.” Therefore, conflicts in Xinjiang, as well as strong separatist sentiments and unrest in Tibet,
provide alluring opportunities for covert American action to undermine Party rule. (“Freedom and
Justice.” China From the Inside.” Dir. Jonathan Lewis. Documentary. KQED and Granada Television,
2007.)
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There are several advantages for China to opt for multilateral cooperation rather than unilateral action on
the issue. Firstly, securing support from its Central Asian neighbors allows China to relax its military
commitments in the region, thus allaying threats of Chinese aggression to the other states while
simultaneously easing its defense expenditures in the area. Secondly, working with the SCO also affords
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“three evil forces of terrorism, separatism, and extremism” (k"ngbù zh)yì, f*nliè zh)yì yü
jídu%n zh)yì de s%n g) xié’è shìlì).110 In 2001, China spearheaded the creation of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization111 presumably to expand its national foreign policy
regarding the “three evil forces” into a multilateral security strategy with several shared
goals in the Central Asian region: regime stability, reduction in ethnic conflict,
maintenance of territorial integrity, and economic development. Despite its underlying
framework, the SCO was touted as a new form of multilateral cooperation, based on an
“open, functional, interest-based” coalition, rather than the outdated European style of a
closed, identity-based and ideologically driven society.112

The SCO’s so-called

“Shanghai spirit”113 (Shàngh&i j'ngshén) and “new regionalism” (x'n q#yù zh)yì) outlook,

China a sense of legitimacy in dealing with violence in Xinjiang province; presumably, should tensions
escalate to conflict, China would be able to rely on a cooperative military endeavor rather than unilateral
actions, which are bound to arouse close scrutiny and skeptical misinterpretation by regional powers and
international observers alike. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a multilateral framework allows
China to maintain its geopolitical interests in the area simultaneously without intimidating its neighbors
with its “peaceful rise” (hépíng juéq$, later renamed “peaceful development”—hépín f%zh&n—in 2004);
specifically, working with the SCO would allow China to avoid alienating U.S. interests in the area and
diminish fears of a “China threat.” (Sheives, Kevin. “China Turns West: Beijing’s Contemporary
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as coined by the Party’s People’s Daily (Rénmín rìbào) newspaper,114 aptly summarized
the innovative trend towards alliances based on mutual respect and commonalities while
setting aside differences. Thus, the organization clearly parallels China’s traditional
policies for non-interference and respect for state sovereignty.
Another prominent element of China’s geopolitical strategy is acquisition of and
unhindered access to natural resources, spurred on by its incredible growth rate in recent
decades. Traditionally, it has relied on the Middle East, Russia, Latin America, Africa,
and Southeast Asia for its energy, with the former supplying the Chinese with as much as
62 percent of its demands.115 However, due to regime instability and erupting violence in
the Middle East, coupled with historical tension with Russia,116 China has turned to
Central Asia as an alternative energy supplier, especially Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan;117
hence, organizations such as the SCO also help to protect China’s economic interests in
the area and maintain its relations with other member states. It is also precisely for this
reason that the American presence in the area is so irritating to the Chinese: not only has
the United States, in addition to Russia, become a serious regional resource competitor, it
also deprives China of a valuable alternative to American dominance of sea-lanes from
the Persian Gulf to Malacca Straits. Similarly, U.S. intervention in the Asian-Pacific
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dispute over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea intrudes on China’s interests in
the area, including access to shipping lanes, oil and gas reserves, and rich fishing
grounds, as well as the desire to resolve the issue via one-on-one negotiations with those
also laying claim to the islands and the seawaters surrounding them.118
One of the ways in which China has responded to increased American
participation in Asian-Pacific affairs is by increasing its armed forces and naval power,119
an agenda which has alarmed U.S. policymakers as well as China’s smaller neighbors.
However, several factors contribute to the unlikelihood of China’s ascension as a
belligerent military power. As mentioned earlier, China’s super-speed development plans
have not been easy given their enormous costs; even with the tremendous economic
statistics that China has been commanding in recent decades, the sheer size of the
country, both in terms of territory and demographics, not to mention the scope and
exigency of long-overdue modernizations and internal advancements, rapidly and
exponentially multiplies its expenditures. Of the Four Modernizations (sì gè xiàndàihuà)
proposed by then Premier Zhou Enlai—agriculture, industry, national defense, science
and technology—it was the last to be addressed and developed by the Party,
demonstrating their prioritization of economic development.120 Hence, China’s capacity
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for military expansion is first and foremost restrained by its limited budget. Even with
China’s annual increase in its defense budget—12.7 percent in 2011121—it would be
exceptional if Chinese military capacities and technologies should seek to match even
half of American capabilities in the near future. Without the geographic advantage of the
United States, China’s military aspirations are also kept in check by wary neighbors,
especially Russia and India, thus further limiting its potential for massive growth beyond
self-defense capabilities. Additionally, the presence of American troops on all sides,
along with sole U.S. naval dominance, serves as a deterrent for ambitious expansion.
Similarly, China also has no experience of modern combat, in contrast with the perennial
military experiences of the United States, such as the Gulf War, Iraq, Afghanistan, and
more recently, Libya. As a result, not only is the PLA chock full of Soviet antiques that
defy modernization, the Chinese are not yet well-versed in military technologies to be
able to develop modern equipment without Russian or American scientific knowledge
and assistance.122 Therefore, it can be reasoned that China’s military expansion is not
intended for aggression but serves four core purposes: firstly, to update and modernize its
forces so that China may defend its territorial claims and put down internal rebellions
without foreign interference;123 secondly, to deter potential external belligerents or to be
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prepared for a martial response to outside aggression;124 thirdly, to secure Chinese access
to maritime trade routes and natural sea resources; and finally, to bolster its status as a
respectable global power.125
Some analysts have speculated that China will use its newfound muscle to sway
opinions in its favor or to coerce others into accommodating or even prioritizing Chinese
interests before their own. While increased might would undoubtedly afford China more
flexibility and room to maneuver in its negotiations with others, China’s rhetoric and
political conduct thus far has revealed a different trend in its policymaking. Chinese
relations with North Korea are a prime example of the Party’s restraint in utilizing
military options for negotiation purposes. Despite persistent rumors that continue to
misgauge the level of camaraderie between the two sides, China’s has consistently
approached the North Korean question as a part of its geopolitical strategy in the
Northeast Asian corridor. Specifically, Beijing fears the collapse of Pyongyang, which
would not only trigger a refugee nightmare for the former and regional instability for the
latter; it would most likely result in reunification with the South. Given South Korea’s
strong ties with the United States, a single Korean state would essentially place the
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Americans at China’s doorstep.126 Nevertheless, China still actively encourages a
multilateral approach to international concerns regarding North Korea’s nuclear
proliferation programs, and, since 1995, has been vehemently denying allegations of a
secret alliance between the two, in which Beijing would immediately come to
Pyongyang’s defense in the event of a war; as one Korean scholar notes, “China now
places more value on national interest, over alliances blinded by ideology.”127
Since the Party’s assumption of leadership, prominent Party members have
consistently reiterated China’s disinclination to become a global superpower,128 seeking
equality with and respect from its sovereign peers. Despite Western skepticism, this is a
logical progression of the Confucian ideal of social harmony, where each state does its
part to preserve the international peace without trying to outmaneuver one another in a
brawn-based game for global domination;129 the end result would be China’s dream of a
multi-polar world. Furthermore, its strong commitment to non-intervention actively
discourages potential abuse of military power; however, it will not hesitate to use military
instruments to prevent and deter encirclement as well as outside interference in its
126
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internal affairs; particularly, in both respects, by the United States. However, traditional
Chinese pragmatism dictates careful consideration before resorting to the use of force, as
any careless act of aggression would most certainly disrupt the peace and stability China
so desperately seeks within its own territory and throughout its surrounding
neighborhoods.
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V || DEMOCRACY WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS
Aside from the sheer size of its territory and demography, China’s decisive roles as a
strategic geopolitical pivot and as a sizeable economic powerhouse earns it an influential
position in the postwar global system, eligible for a fast-track entrance into the elite great
powers club, despite its evident status as a developing state throughout its modern era.
However, its peers have consistently demonstrated reluctance to fully recognize China as
one of their own, presumably due to the Party’s insistence on autocratic governance while
actively suppressing civilian attempts at democratic and political reform. These tensions
have generated much friction in East-West relations, especially between China and the
United States, and serve to highlight a prominent dichotomy between the political
cultures of Beijing and Washington: as the former struggles towards a world order that
respects its sovereignty while tolerating a different methodology and timeframe for
political and economic reform, the latter focuses its energy on condemning those who do
not follow its specific brand of governance; curtailing definitions for already ill-defined
concepts such as democracy, human rights, and rule of law, as a means to further restrict
membership into the private circle of international society’s self-anointed crème de la
crème.
A key source of contention lies with the conceptualization of democracy,
conventionally defined as a government by the majority of those being governed.
Historically, as Western nations have monopolized the embodiment of the democratic
model, their method of ascertaining legitimacy from the people—free elections held in
consistent intervals—has become the golden standard for developing states to emulate as
part of their transition from autocracies to democracies, especially in the postwar period.
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However, insistence on such technicalities marks the failure of Euro-America to embrace
the creative spirit of the democratic tradition, as the subjectivity of the democratic
experience has led to its classification as only a “partial institution”130 that encompasses a
wide range of forms and implementations. Thus, it makes more sense to observe and
analyze democratic trends in China from a broader perspective, where the democratic
nature of a regime is characterized by established legitimacy from the people and regular
changes in leadership at periodic intervals.131 The Chinese approach to democracy
reflects their preferred style for decision-making: pragmatism in the form of thorough
assessments, careful preparations, and maintaining the long view. Therefore, political
reform and transition to a more democratic form of government has been slow and
cumbersome, albeit existent and progressive.
After 1949, and especially in the post-Mao era, the new generation of leaders
recognized the importance of obtaining political consensus between a state and its people,
as Mao purported with his comment that an imposed government is an unsustainable
one.132 In the absence of direct elections, the Chinese Communist Party faced the
continuous challenge of securing legitimacy of rule from its people. Unlike many other
imposed authoritarian regimes, the Party opted for a different, more gradual approach133
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by following the footsteps of the Confucian tradition: using familiar social rituals and
customizing reforms with traditional Chinese sensibilities to generate a system of rewards
and punishments134 that can offset potential political destabilization from the
overwhelming strength in numbers of the masses. Thus, to modernize and to develop the
country rapidly and efficiently, the Party sought to retain its power; on the one hand, this
would allow it to oversee the implementation of the entire development agenda from
beginning to end, adjusting to any unforeseen complications or obstacles along the way;
on the other hand, constant singular rule would allow citizens to adapt to dramatic
changes without being entirely overwhelmed, thus tempering any potential chaos that
may arise from the transition.135 In the decades following the revolution, the Party aimed
to reform millennia of outdated Chinese traditions gradually, by bringing it up to date
with a modern makeover. However, the tenacity of Chinese culture combined with the
Chinese people’s social cohesion and willingness to endure hardships required a drastic
re-evaluation and eventual deconstruction of established social and political norms, a feat
that could be accomplished only through Mao’s vision of continuous revolution.136 Once
China had undergone sufficient social and political turbulence, the Party began to
introduce new measures in a steady, trial-and-error manner, choosing to focus primarily
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on the development of an “independent and relatively comprehensive industrial and
economic system,”137 to be followed by the Four Modernizations.138
Though China had opened up considerably to the rest of the world by the 1970s, it
still remained extremely private about its internal developments—presumably, to protect
its territorial integrity and the domestic legitimacy of the Party. Thus, the most visible
part of its reform agenda was primarily economic in nature, starting with state
socialism,139 which eventually transitioned to an open market economy by the 1980s. In
light of its great power status, Beijing was also especially conscious of its backwardness
137
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and poverty,140 attributing both to underdevelopment. As a result, it utilized the overlap
between socialism and democracy—that individual liberties must be temporarily
curtailed for the necessary accumulation of wealth141—to modify all existing social and
political instruments to serve its economic sector efficiently and improve the well-being
of the Chinese people. Drawing strongly upon Confucian principles, while relying on
traditional social harmonies to prevent the “evils of capitalism,” the Party focused on
leveling the economic playing field, while increasing overall quality of life via ensuring
the livelihood of the people (mínsh*ng zh)yì), providing equal access to education and
economic productivity,142 supporting the community, contributing to scholarship, and
promoting Chinese culture. In recent decades, Beijing has devoted much of its
developmental budget and efforts to its western campaign, as the area that had only
experienced minimal direct benefits from China’s market reforms. For other parts of the
country, Party leadership called upon the entrepreneurial spirit of the people, encouraging
the Chinese to “emphasize professional competence over political correctness” by taking
control of their futures and excelling in a field of their choice.143 Even as Western
observers heatedly oppugn the Party’s strict policy barring and censoring various foreign
ventures, such as Google or Facebook, such initiatives serve to push Chinese
entrepreneurs to develop similar enterprises that would specifically cater to Chinese
interests. From a business perspective, such a solution is not only pragmatic but
140
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incredibly sound: with over one billion customers to draw upon, and more and more
Chinese becoming connected via modern technology everyday, these Party restrictions,
though irksome to Western capitalists and some Chinese individuals, provide a great
opportunity for many Chinese to hone their productive skills and advance technology
using Chinese resources. For the companies that do survive the chopping block and are
given a chance to expand into the Chinese marketplace, China’s enormous consumer base
still requires many corporations to reconsider and revise their business models to tailor to
Chinese customers, revealing a window of opportunity for budding Chinese
entrepreneurs to learn from non-Chinese while also helping these companies adapt to an
unfamiliar market.144 Another Party initiative that draws much ire from its neighbors as
well as those in the West is the decision to peg the Chinese currency, or yuán; 145 the
main domestic sociopolitical goal being the encouragement of export-oriented industries
and continued improvements in the day-to-day lives of the Chinese, opting for
international censure in lieu of domestic economic meltdown and the social unrest that is
bound to ensue.146
Economic development and capital accumulation was only one half of the
challenge; the other half being the extreme rural poverty and underdevelopment. To
tackle this, the post-Mao regime experimented with democratic self-government at the
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grassroots level, to address citizens’ daily concerns locally. Starting as early as the 1950s,
Villager Committees (c#nmín w(iyuánhuì, or VC) were established for rural citizens to
elect leaders directly to represent their interests; urban residents experienced a similar
process, with the implementation of Residential Committees (j#mín w(iyuánhuì), later
changed to Community Residents’ Committee (shèq# j#mín w(iyuánhuì, or CRC); the
committees were revitalized in the early 1980s, after their reiteration in the Chinese
Constitution in 1982, and established in accordance with four democratic principles:
democratic elections, democratic decision-making, democratic management, and
democratic oversight.147 The VCs and CRCs were intended to serve several essential
purposes. Firstly, the committees set out to lay a solid foundation for developing rule of
law, previously nonexistent in China, by teaching citizens of their rights and
responsibilities, as well as the importance of holding their leaders accountable. As one
official in Hebei Province of Qianxi County has commented, “You cannot separate
democracy and the rule of law. Democracy is the foundation and guarantee of doing
things according to the law.”148 Secondly, they give people a chance to elect familiar and
trusted individuals to promote political stability and economic prosperity, progressing
towards greater administrative and financial transparency and accountability,
respectively.149 A series of complementary reforms include increased corruption150
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prevention and supervision,151 such as setting up hotlines and registering civilian
complaints, while also allowing greater participation in the legislative process. Thirdly,
the committees forge relations between the citizens and neighborhood leaders, which then
help to improve relations between local communities and the state; as noted by one
commentator, these grassroots committees have allowed the Party to gain credibility
without detracting from the overall democratic experiment.152 Despite international
criticisms regarding the insufficiency of these reforms,153 the results have been generally
positive and promising of more liberalization, though by no means perfect.154 Though
there are those who question the slowness of reform and remain concerned that such
democratic reforms are simply a front for the Party’s insistent grip on power, Professor
Wang Xixin, from the Beijing University Law School, assuages such fears on the
grounds that “The process may be very, very long – the development of democracy is
step by step. But the continuous progress of an increasingly effective democracy may in
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the end succeed in restricting the power of the Party.”155 Most citizens view the
committees as legitimate, generally capable of resolving issues of practical concern,
while offering the people more choices than the past elections.156 Beijing has taken great
care to tweak the system and adjust it to changing conditions as necessary: a recent
change allowing the people to nominate election candidates directly rather than choosing
from a Party-selected and endorsed candidates highlights the Party’s willingness to adapt
different factors of the experiment to the Chinese experience, revealing a carefully and
meticulously planned trend towards “democracy with Chinese characteristics.”
Though Beijing has yet to open the polls officially for central Party elections, it
should be noted that in the post-Mao era, candidates for these offices have become
increasingly identified and selected from popular and competent individuals from local
elections in the VCs and CRCs.157 For lower positions, the traditional Confucian system
of meritocracy has been revived and modernized for recruitment through competitive
examinations. Individuals appointed to the higher offices are carefully hand-selected
from a pool of qualified candidates who satisfy a variety of criteria, including age,
education (usually opting for individuals who have attained a higher level of education),
merit, demonstrated loyalty and overall competency in supporting the Party’s vision and
goals, and a generally successful track record at lower levels of government. While this

155

“Power and the People.” China From the Inside. Dir. Jonathan Lewis. Documentary. KQED and
Granada Television, 2007.

156

In one study conducted in the urban CRCs, individuals with stronger democratic beliefs expressed less
support for the system due to lack of internal political efficacy, perceived meddling and control by the
Party, and the CRCs’ inability to successfully address all local issues, such as integrity of property rights.
Similar trends also show that individuals in newly developed housing complexes were less likely to have
faith in the CRC than those in traditional housing complexes. (Chen, Lu, and Yang. “Popular Support for
Grassroots Self-Government in Urban China: Findings from a Beijing Survey.” 521-2.)
157
Horsley, Jaime P. “Village Elections: Training Ground for Democratization.”

59

system fails to conform to global standards for either democracy or autocracy, it caters to
a specific brand of Chinese politics that is well-suited for its role in the world order: it
was in this spirit, for example, that Chinese Vice Premiere Xi Jinping,158 Hu Jintao’s
likely successor during projected leadership transitions in late 2012,159 recently embarked
on his highly publicized trip to the United States,160 presumably to introduce him to
significant U.S. officials, while also familiarizing American leaders with China’s next
leader before the official change in power,161 a diplomatic gesture that would be not be
possible under the conventional style of democracy. The established stability of the
system has attested to the degree of legitimacy bestowed upon the government by its
people, despite the absence of direct election of Party leaders.162
The most prominent contemporary example of political unrest in China is, of
course, the events that unfolded in Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989. The international
media lambasted Beijing for its seemingly over-reactive response to a peaceful student
demonstration, citing the event as a visible manifestation of social unhappiness in China,
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specifically with Party rule. However, some scholars better versed with the nuances of
the Chinese perspective and more familiar with its long-term cultural trends have since
analyzed the situation in retrospect, taking into account the long view of the Party’s
ultimate development goals. Tiananmen did emerge at the end of a decade of
unprecedented economic progress for China and new levels of civil freedoms for its
citizens. In spite of such dramatic changes, the majority of Chinese were eager to burst
out of the confines of Confucian tradition and freely indulge in Western ideology; as a
result, general unhappiness with issues such as political corruption, economic inflation,
restrictions on civil liberties, subpar university conditions, and the persistent dominance
of the Party at all levels of governance resulted in student-led protests.163 However, some
scholars have observed that despite massive protests, Tiananmen did not represent a
legitimacy crisis, as the Party was able to command the resources of the state and
maintain its monopoly on violence.164 Even Beijing’s demonstrated patience throughout
the initial unfolding of the crisis suggests that the eventual brutal repression was executed
as a last resort, when the situation began to escalate beyond a simple student protest.165 It
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may also be possible that as tensions mounted in Tiananmen Square, the Party may have
suspected covert foreign involvement in the incident, thus warranting a more ferocious
response to maintain its international credibility, reiterate its stance on non-intervention,
and more importantly, retain control over its own domestic affairs. Ultimately, as one
pundit points out, Deng’s pragmatic response to the Tiananmen incident stayed consistent
with the Party’s logic of preceding political reform with economic changes,166 not so
much reflecting insistence on Deng’s part to retain power but more of the Party’s aims of
bettering the lives of its people in the long run.167

demonstrations,… that the government hold talks with student leaders… [and] threatened to lead a
general strike if the central committee failed to accept his demands.” From these accounts, one can
surmise that the events in the days leading up to the Tiananmen incident had escalated beyond a simple
peaceful student protest, involving actors who were willing to take more drastic (and perhaps more
violent) measures to ensure that their demands were met. During the actual event, the eyewitness account
of a Chilean diplomat recalls that soldiers dispatched into the Square for crowd control “did not [mass
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Though Party repression of political dissent in China have consistently punctuated world news
headlines, even after Tiananmen, the Party has actively, though quietly, taken gradual steps to soften its
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Overall, the Party has worked to earn the legitimacy of its people by employing a
tailored yet comprehensive development agenda to better the lives of all its citizens; as
Deng Xiaoping proposed in a speech to the Central Committee in 1979, “What kind of
democracy do the Chinese people need today? It can only be socialist democracy,
people’s democracy, and not a bourgeois democracy, individualist democracy.”168
Though the West continues to view China as a state with a weak legal system, poor
system of human rights, and as a stubborn opponent of democracy, China has defied
occidental theory by successfully implementing market reform and achieving economic
growth despite slower political progress. While ultimately the sustainability and success
of the Chinese system is still up for debate, China’s pragmatic leadership has exhibited a
strong determination to learn from the mistakes of others,169 most notably the Soviet
Union, and has thus far enjoyed relative success in this endeavor. Compared to its peers
in the lower-middle income class, China has made incredible progress and performed
spectacularly since 1978. The Chinese people not only enjoy greater civil and political
freedoms than previously allowed, China also outperforms the average country in its tier
regarding most human rights issues; in fact, as one UCLA scholar points out, it is only
when China is evaluated in comparison to other great powers that it disappoints across
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the board.170 Nevertheless, China’s great power status also allows it to stave off
international pressure to conform to myopic Western systems, and pursue a
“contextualized approach to legal reforms [resulting] in steady progress.”171 Though it is
tempting to group China with the other economic success stories in the region—namely,
the Asian Tigers—it would not be completely appropriate to categorize China as a
protégé of the ill-defined “East Asian Path”172 as its “democracy with Chinese
characteristics” is a truly unique model of political reform that may be hard for other
developing countries to imitate without the Chinese advantages of size and geopolitical
significance. However, China’s political values of non-interference and tolerance of
different regime types provide a refreshing alternative to western theoretical arrogance,173
and may serve as an inspiration to those facing their own developmental challenges.
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Henry Kissinger draws a poignant comparison between the United States and China as the two
predominant visionaries for developing countries, since both are “not so much nation-states as
continental expressions of cultural identities, [where] both have historically been driven to visions of
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VI || CHARM OFFENSIVE
Since the end of the Cold War, China has striven to shed its image as the villainous
ideological antagonist and taken on the daunting task of reinventing its identity as a rising
global power with a responsible agenda for peaceful development. To reverse decades of
stubborn

perspectives—including

international

hostility

towards

its

perceived

suppression of Taiwanese statehood—and to command respect and admiration from its
peers, Beijing draws upon its domestic influences to help shape its strategy for securing
or strengthening relations beyond its territorial borders. The combination of Chinese
hospitality and ceremony as part of its psychological strategy overseas has been often
dubbed by Western media and scholars as China’s “charm offensive,” its ultimate goal
being to further China’s quest for international legitimacy and to accomplish its core
foreign policy objectives,174 namely maintaining a peaceful international environment,
assisting the developing world as needed in accordance with Mao’s still-influential
“Three Worlds” theory, and securing unhindered access to raw materials to fuel
continued economic growth.175

174

Despite necessarily adjusting its foreign policy for current world affairs, China’s agenda has been
largely consistent since the end of World War II. It is nearly impossible to empirically demonstrate this
claim in such an abbreviated space, but even from a brief overview of Chinese international relations in
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As foreign businessmen have come to learn in conducting commercial relations
with their Chinese counterparts, China’s history and traditions play a decisive role176 in
shaping its conduct with other actors in the international system. The concept of relations
(gu%nxi) is especially important, as the Chinese have always valued the personal aspect of
a relationship177 rather than formal documentation of camaraderie; in fact, China has
gained somewhat of a reputation for unwavering loyalty to its allies, albeit not with an
unlimited price. However, in line with its principle of non-intervention, Beijing also
insists on cooperative relations that do not inhibit the sovereignty, flexibility, or
maneuverability of all involved parties. Thus, in keeping with this paradigm, negotiation
deadlocks are therefore not only accepted, but also anticipated as an inevitable part of
doing business.178 To set it apart from some its great power peers, especially when
wooing developing states, China emphatically highlights its tolerance of political
differences and its lack of desire to impose its views or perspectives on others. In fact,
post-Mao politicians have repeatedly asserted China’s role as a humble student of all,179
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including smaller nations; urban Chinese are also actively encouraged to learn about the
world, especially in the wake of China’s economic growth.180 This pragmatic take on
international relations, heavily reinforced by Deng Xiaoping’s vision for China’s
modernized development, has undoubtedly contributed to what Kishore Mahbubani hails
as China’s “[restrained] and remarkable diplomatic skills,” which he gives a near-perfect
ranking on an ascending scale of geopolitical competency.181
Nevertheless, during the last few decades of the 20th century, ideology trumped
tradition, as China’s international relations presented an alternative to American ideals
worldwide. Initially, during the mid-1990s, Chinese attempts to undermine U.S. influence
in the Asian-Pacific region flopped, as increased Chinese military aggression actually
drew American allies in the region closer to the United States, in effect, tightening the
geopolitical encirclement of China.182 As a result, China re-routed its strategy to appeal to
states that relied on the support of great powers to guarantee their interests without
antagonizing their sense of freedom or integrity. China’s “new security concept” of the
late 1990s183 reflected this change in thinking as it strove to emphasize the role of
multilateral institutions in achieving “win-win” situations for those sharing mutual
interests. Beijing’s rapid adjustment of its foreign agenda could not have happened at a
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more advantageous moment: at a time when the United States was bent on utilizing its
ideals and hegemonic position to validate intervention in world affairs, China swooped in
with a pledge of political friendships free of strings and conditions184 with regards to
individually-determined institutions, such as sovereignty, economy, mode of governance,
or political values. China’s successful transformation from an impoverished, peasantbased society into a nouveau-riche great power captivated the imaginations of many who
had become disillusioned with Western charm, challenging the global perceptions of “the
promised land,” traditionally designated as American or European.185 China’s adamancy
on privacy for its internal affairs also contrasted directly to the American experience,
where issues such as Party errors or ongoing developmental challenges, especially
lingering poverty, are not exposed to the international public for scrutiny, furthering
glamorization of China as the exotic new frontier.
In particular, China predominantly appeals to developing countries, including
emerging democracies, because it, unlike the West—specifically the United States186—
refrains from lecturing others on issues such as democracy, human rights, or rule of
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law.187 Its breezy “sign first, talk later” style contrasts with tedious negotiations with the
West, often weighed down by bureaucratic technicalities and procedural difficulties.
China’s Deputy Foreign Minister Zhou Wenzhong succinctly captured this point when he
said, “Business is business. We try to separate politics from business.”188 This pragmatic
strategy is extremely effective especially in the short run simply because Beijing has yet
to obtain the financial clout of Washington, Brussels, or Tokyo, to incentivize developing
states. It also allows China to collaborate with developing states, particularly in Africa
and Latin America, to work towards increasing a positive balance of trade by reversing
financial instability or to help them pay off their own debts, often resulting from
conditioned negotiations with the West.189 What is more, China’s highly successful
economic growth has motivated developing nations to improve the standards, quality, and
overall efficiency of their own development agendas. Chinese businessmen and
politicians have also taken incredible care to be well-versed in potential areas of
investment, learning foreign languages and local cultures as necessary. Most importantly,
Beijing strives to align its mutual interests with that of the developing state; combining
diplomatic instruments, financial incentives, peace-keeping, and military cooperation as a
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comprehensive package for bilateral relations.190 Thus, China’s approach focuses on
shared goals for local-based needs, such as regional socioeconomic development, rather
than solely on Chinese interests.
As the West faces increased competition for influences in regions that it has
traditionally monopolized, it has begun to condemn China vociferously for the latter’s
blatant disregard for moralistic considerations, such as human rights, in its insatiable
quest for raw materials and resources; of especial Occidental concern is China’s exports
of its own poor governance standards abroad, such as lack of transparency or violations
of basic civilian privileges. However, three points serve to contradict such notions.
Firstly, the truth is that China’s conduct differs little from Western behavior in these
regions, especially in former Western colonies, as recently as half a century ago; despite
Western reforms in its interactions with these areas, it can be argued that such changes
have come about mostly due to the West’s near-absolute, if not already complete,
development. That being said, China does not employ these historical precedents as
justification for completely disregarding its current responsibilities; in fact, Beijing
strives to cooperate with Western institutions in shaping its engagements in the
developing world, so as to remain accountable for its actions while, more importantly, not
undermining Western political or security interests. In light of its growing international
responsibilities, China had quietly rescinded its declaration to stay uninvolved in general
world affairs and began participating in peace-keeping missions sanctioned by the United
Nations, most of which are located in Africa; as a result, Beijing is actually the largest
contributor of peace-keeping volunteers of all the permanent members on the UNSC.191
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To qualify its unconditional aid, China has also been partnering with several aid donors
as to avoid stepping on the toes of international institutions such as the World Bank or
International Monetary Fund. It is also contemplating the creation of a Chinese version of
USAID, with the goal that such an institution would adopt a more accountable attitude
towards development projects than the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, which has been
overlooking such ventures thus far.192 Furthermore, friendly engagements with regimes
traditionally hostile to Western powers grants China an indispensible role in serving as a
mediator to promote peace and stable development in territories beyond the scope of
American and European influences, such as North Korea and Burma.
Secondly, China’s efforts to portray itself as a “responsible great power” requires
an upgrade of its own domestic standards, so as to avoid projecting an image of
hypocrisy. As a result, the Party has taken active steps to tackle sensitive issues back
home, such as establishing a solid foundation for rule of law, encouraging good business
practices, and installing anti-corruption legislation. Finally, it can be argued that China’s
investments, though not up to par with Western standards of morality, are still
contributing massive benefits to struggling states, especially in areas of development
traditionally neglected by Western investors, such as infrastructure. Within the confines
of China’s own neighborhood, Beijing has compiled an impressive list of
accomplishments such as improving railways for transportation, paving roads to adjacent
countries, building border gates, and upgrading highways.193 Specifically throughout
parts of Africa, China has contributed to local development by undertaking “prestige
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projects” such as the construction of public buildings and stadiums, as well as sending
technical teams to train and assist local groups; even China’s heavily-criticized arms
suppliers contribute by taking on meaningful civil engineering projects.194 As one
academic has noted, China’s engagement in Africa serves to fill in many of the gaps
which Western sources are either “uninterested in or unwilling to provide,”195 such as
expansion into “inhospitable” war-torn neighborhoods.196 Though China is fully aware
that its relations with rogue regimes not only endanger its workers197 but also its
reputation, it considers these risks as “part of the learning curve and price of ‘going
global’198” and consistently seeks to cooperate with the United Nations and similar
multilateral institutions, as well as the governments of the states in question. China’s
reluctance to use military force199 to respond to security challenges it has encountered in
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Africa (e.g. most recently in Egypt and Sudan), though consistent with its noninterventionist nature, has generated much criticism, especially from the Chinese people;
regarding the recent Sudanese kidnappings, one Chinese blogger vented, “If it was the
United States or Russia, they would have air dropped in special commandos by now.”200
Undoubtedly, China’s ventures have created tensions with developing and
advanced economies, as commentators have called China’s dual roles as benefactors and
competitors into question. In particular, China’s candid attitude about prioritizing its own
national interests has perturbed those who believe that China’s actions may serve to
undercut their own interests. One of the most common complaints lodged against Chinese
investors is their reliance on importing cheaper domestic labor, rather than utilizing
workers from the country in which they are conducting their business.201 Cui Janjun,
secretary-general of the China International NGO Network, addressing the issue at 2007
seminar on Chinese affairs, offered an angry retort to such accusations, stating, “We
Chinese had to make the same hard decision on whether to accept foreign investment
many, many years ago. You have to make the right decision or you will lose, lose, lose.
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You have to decide right, or you will remain poor, poor, poor.”202 However, as one
scholar points out, China’s foreign policy regarding Africa has, from the outset,
“conformed to the interests and needs of Africans to a greater degree than any other
external power.”203 As another academic observes, not only do the Chinese have factories
that present African people with jobs and African entrepreneurs with production
techniques and technologies, China’s business model also incentivizes the African upper
class to return some of their foreign-held capital back to the continent.204 Similarly,
China’s local conduct within its own neighborhood reiterates its commitments to mutual
interests, as China strives to promote the economic integration of Asia by working with
different states in the region to strengthen their respective comparative advantages, rather
than by undermining one another through competition. A primary example of this,
according to one expert, regards China’s emergence as an important customer in the
Central Asian oil business: though China has effectively terminated the Russian
monopoly in the area, it is by no means an indispensible customer, as the oil suppliers are
constantly looking to diversify their customer base.205 In line with this argument, it would
be logical to presume that China’s emergence on most other markets can be interpreted in
a similar manner, where China’s status as a financial heavyweight certainly incentivizes
suppliers to conduct business with Beijing, but not necessarily at the cost of curtailing
business with other economic powerhouses.

Even China’s trade with financially
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disadvantaged states, such as with many of its African partners, have been advantageous
for African citizens, giving them access to a lifestyle previously unattainable by their
modest incomes, and helping their governments manage outstanding debts owed to
Western creditors. A separate study presents evidentiary support for the claim that despite
Hu Jintao’s 2003 proclamation of oil and finance as two components of Chinese national
economic security, Chinese ambitions in the Middle East have not undermined U.S.
efforts towards attaining peace and stability within the region.206 With imported oil still
constituting a minor portion of China’s energy consumption, and Beijing’s focus on
developing renewable energies, there is simply no need for China to discard its
pragmatism in its quest to secure raw materials, so long it does not perceive external
meddling with regards to its access of resources. Hence, as part of its primary agenda of
maintaining world peace and stability, China continues to cooperate with major
powers,207 such as the United States, India and Pakistan, in areas or territories of
contention, opting for solutions that mutually benefit all parties involved. In areas of
international concern, China also serves as a mediator between the West and developing
states, encouraging the former to lessen its pressures (e.g. sanctions) on the latter in
exchange for better cooperation on Western-led initiatives.
Overall, China’s charm offensive is, in the words of one Los Angeles Times’
reporter, “no longer limited to just ping-pong scrimmages and gifts of pandas,”208 but has
evolved to encompass a broader mix of political and economic hardball with softer social
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and cultural influences. Beijing’s overall strategy not only includes cooperating with
political allies and trading partners by looking for solutions that cater to the mutual
benefits of all parties involved, it also aims to use Chinese traditions and culture to entice
international actors to engage with China. Despite drastic changes in the international
system throughout its modern era, one of China’s biggest challenges continues to be the
struggle to find its proper footing for balancing its responsibilities as a great power and
its agenda as a developing state. Though Western observers have expressed displeasure at
China’s way of conducting business, it would be unfair to expect China to supererogate at
the expense of its limited resources and capabilities. Chinese pragmatism has remained
consistent throughout its engagement with the developing world; even when recent
events have called for China to re-evaluate its commitment to non-intervention, Beijing
has been reluctant to dispose of, or even redefine, its dearly-held principles. Therefore,
even if one may disagree with China’s way of doing business, China’s unwavering
approach to its foreign policy, as well as its loyalty to both its traditional ideals, values,
and friends remain a commendable aspect of its successful overall strategy to secure
global legitimacy and maintain a peaceful international system.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
As China braces itself for a new generation of Party leaders, international observers and
Chinese citizens alike cannot help but wonder about the future of China’s continued
developments in economics, geo-strategy, and perhaps most importantly, political reform.
Specifically, even before the time Hu’s successor assumes his role as China’s next
president, there are already speculations as to whether or not this individual will be the
visionary to lead China towards the next step of its political liberation. Nevertheless,
despite the lingering question marks, China’s future is far from being uncertain. The trials
and tribulations it has undergone since the inception of Party rule have attested to the
strength and tenacity not only of the Chinese people but its cultural values and historical
traditions as well. Though some scholars have observed a consistency in Beijing’s
foreign policy from 1949 onwards, few have investigated the source of this regularity. It
may suffice to say that every nation may draw upon its culture to provide a frame of
reference for interpreting the world, and that subsequently, states also draw upon these
cultural traditions to shape their political values. However, given the continuing
controversy and speculation surrounding China’s rise over the past few decades, it is
imperative for scholars in this field to become more well-versed in the foundations of
China’s domestic political culture and reorient their theoretical approaches to reflect a
more relevant perspective. This slight shift in perspective also offers tremendous
implications, especially for those who wish to engage in forecasting, as the Chinese
experience presents a much more cohesive and comprehensible narrative when examined
in the context of its history
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Of the three pillars deemed critical to the foundation of China’s political values,
its social philosophies are perhaps most vulnerable to assault by Western ideals. As China
gradually opens itself up to the rest of the world, foreign values, such as capitalism and
individualism, have taken the Chinese population by storm, as a novel alternative to
millennia of monogamous adherence to traditional schools of thought. The explosion of
Christianity has also drawn millions of followers away from historically-favored
institutions, further complicating what Premier Wen Jiabao had once supposedly referred
to as a “spiritual crisis” in the country. The growth in the number of Chinese Christians
serves not only to challenge predominant social trends, but has put forth economic
implications as well, posing questions about the role of religion in perpetuating Westernstyle capitalism in a country that is looking to embrace market reform on its own
terms.209 While it would be imprudent to disregard completely the capacity of these new
influences to alter persistent Chinese values, the demonstrated pragmatism and long view
approach espoused by the Party thus far have given scholars and observers alike some
indication as to the degree and pace of change to be anticipated from penetrating
ideologies.
For instance, although China’s Constitution openly declares for “citizens of the
People’s Republic of China [to] enjoy freedom of religious belief,” the clause is qualified
with a stipulation that “religious bodies and religious affairs are not [to be] subject to any
foreign domination,”210 tying into Chinese themes of non-intervention. As such, the Party
has taken careful measures to ensure that theological imports consist of purely religious
209
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thought by sanctioning official state-sponsored institutions to be free of allegiances to
foreign agendas. Though such Party initiatives are to be expected, as well as subsequent
citizen defiance by supporting unofficial underground churches, they seem rather
redundant, as Chinese Christianity has confirmed operation as a religion, rather than a
social philosophy. Therefore, it is hardly surprising to see Christianity as being
complementary, rather than in competition, with traditional institutions such as
Confucianism. Specifically, both institutions work well together to temper the rampage of
other foreign values, such as materialism and capitalism, which have taken the mainland
by storm. In this sense, Christianity offers not so much an attack on domestic cultural
institutions, but presents a refreshing attempt to reorient the Chinese towards the
traditional values touted by their ancient philosophies, without employing the Confucian
imagery and terminology that many Chinese have come to label as outdated and no
longer applicable to modern China.211 Christian emphasis on social work and service also
help to bolster and to reconstruct the idea of the “harmonious society” (héxié shèhuì), a
primary focus of Chinese public life that had been overwhelmed by fixations on
economic prosperity and material indulgence.
China’s Christian experience underscores the malleability of the Chinese
paradigm to adapt to modern world experiences, much as it has done over the past few
millennia, extracting ideas and influences from other institutions to augment and improve
itself as needed. In the absence of a standardized theological framework, the Chinese
choose to rely on natural paragons and pragmatism to interpret the world around them.
Thus, as exhibited by its steadfast foreign policy agenda in its modern era, China’s
211
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political culture also tends to follow the natural ebb and flow of current world events. In
this sense, its political attitudes can be figuratively expressed as a flowing river, where
the course and direction of the waters are predetermined, but the obstacles along the way
will require adaptations. The analogy can further be extended in two ways: preparation
for, and ultimately, eradication of the anticipated obstructions. In terms of the former,
difficulties are not always visible from a distance. Therefore, while the Party embraces
the long view that will undoubtedly involve several stumbling blocks along the way, no
drastic measures are employed until the obstacle plays a direct role in obstructing
progress (as opposed to a vague figurative role, riddled with uncertainty). In terms of the
latter, the Chinese do not respond to their obstacles with swift, brutal obliteration. Rather,
they seek to work around their difficulties with as little disruption to both parties as
possible, seeking not to disturb the natural balance of the world. This is especially
manifested by China’s dedication to transitioning its Confucian ideal of social harmony
from its domestic sphere to the international arena, further emphasized by its dedication
to principles of non-intervention and multilateralism.
Thus far, China’s extraordinary capability of preserving internal institutions of
thought against unrelenting Western efforts to impose their ideals on others, has
commanded exceptional international respect, especially from its peers in the developing
world. Its achievements are further enhanced when one takes into consideration China’s
ability to accomplish these goals not only on such a short timeline but also during a
period of inchoate development and on a relatively modest income. For some, China
serves as an exemplary counterweight to the Western model, specifically against
perceived American cultural and ideological imperialism, an alternative ideology
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available for subscription. For others, China’s experience functions as a tremendous
source of inspiration, a testament to the fact that nation-states can and do successfully
stand up to Western domination by resolutely committing to their own political culture
and values. However, despite the commendable praise following its success thus far, it is
important to note that China occupies a relatively atypical position in world affairs,
replete with multitudinous factors that would be difficult for others to replicate,
especially those wishing to follow in China’s development footsteps. On the economic
end, it is China’s massive internal consumer base, a statistic that hardly any other country
in the world claims, that has allowed for socioeconomic experiments such as VCs and
CRCs, as well as Party encouragement of domestic entrepreneurial initiatives. Politically,
it is China’s rather exceptional statuses as a geopolitical and economic heavyweight as
well as a developing state that grants it a greater sense of flexibility and wider range for
maneuvering free from intrusive Western influences. To this end, China’s leaders are
quick to advise others not to follow directly in their footsteps, stating, “If there is any
experience on our part, it is to formulate policies in light of one’s own national
conditions.”212
Beijing’s quest to understand the rise of past great powers via its 2006 televised
documentary series213 may not have uncovered a fail-proof formula on how to achieve
and retain hegemonic status, but it has gleaned much insight on how China might manage
its own rise towards the top. For starters, China’s vision of a harmonious multi-polar
212
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society fundamentally differs from the Western (read: American) definition for a
balanced world order, spearheaded primarily by the United States and others in the elite
democracy club.214 While the former would not voluntarily and magnanimously
relinquish the special privileges afforded by its great power status in the name of world
egalitarianism, it has made solid efforts to ensure that its actions do not infringe upon
another state’s legalistic privileges and territorial integrity, no matter the size or
geopolitical significance of the latter. To this end, China’s actions, while solely focused
on serving its self-interests, do not reflect an ill-intentioned agenda to undermine others.
Such a liberal point of view may seem to contradict China’s realist attitude towards the
United States, with whom, some have argued, it is engaged in a zero-sum game, but
various empirical sources, as highlighted throughout this study, demonstrate that this is
not necessarily the case; in political and economic manners, Beijing has more than
demonstrated its willingness to cooperate with Washington, taking care to pirouette
around U.S. interests overseas, as to not step on American toes. Such a pattern of
behavior lends credence to China’s wéiqí approach to promote peaceful international
relations, rather than opting for a crushing triumph in the form of a Western style
checkmate. China’s ability to cultivate a strong sense of legitimacy, both from its
populace and from the international community, attests to its willingness to listen to input
and factor in necessary changes, despite the Party’s seeming obstinacy to change.
Ultimately, it seems as if China has learned a most vital lesson from observing the rise
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(and potential downfall, in the eyes of some commentators) of the United States: while an
open society is undoubtedly courageous and admirable for its transparency, it lends itself
to external definitions, lessening its control over its own responsibilities and
accomplishments. From the Chinese perspective, the real act of bravery consists of
defining one’s own destiny, and working towards the perpetuation of one’s vision, even
in the face of extreme adversity and international stigmatization. Thus, as it has for most
of its long history, China will, at least for the foreseeable future, continue to adhere to its
values and use its beloved traditions to guide and shape its path towards the future.
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